Saving Massiah from Elstad: The Admissibility of Successive Confessions Following a Deprivation of Counsel by Tomkovicz, James K.
William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal
Volume 15 | Issue 3 Article 2
Saving Massiah from Elstad: The Admissibility of
Successive Confessions Following a Deprivation of
Counsel
James K. Tomkovicz
Copyright c 2007 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj
Repository Citation
James K. Tomkovicz, Saving Massiah from Elstad: The Admissibility of Successive Confessions Following
a Deprivation of Counsel, 15 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 711 (2007), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/
wmborj/vol15/iss3/2
SAVING MASSIAH FROM ELSTAD: THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
SUCCESSIVE CONFESSIONS FOLLOWING A DEPRIVATION
OF COUNSEL
James J. Tomkovicz*
INTRODUCTION
Fellers v. United States' brought two issues before the Supreme Court. The first,
quite elementary issue pertained to the substance of the Sixth Amendment entitlement
to the assistance of counsel to protect against the government's pretrial efforts to secure
confessions.' More specifically, the question was whether the guarantee of counsel
is available only when officials employ "interrogation." 3 The second, decidedly more
complicated issue focused on the exclusionary consequences of a counsel deprivation.4
More particularly, the question was whether the doctrine of Oregon v. Elstad5 -a Fifth
Amendment based, Miranda doctrine rule-governs in analogous Sixth Amendment
situations.6 In a previous article, I analyzed the Court's decisive resolution of the sub-
stantive issue at length, promising to turn my attention later to the second, unresolved
exclusionary rule question.7 This piece fulfills that pledge.
The Sixth Amendment exclusionary rule question raised in Fellers is interest-
ing and significant for a number of reasons. First, severe erosion of the protections
afforded by the Miranda doctrine has made preservation of the Sixth Amendment
safeguards against official efforts to secure admissions of guilt all the more critical.
Second, the reaffirmation of a generous entitlement to pretrial assistance in Fellers
could prove inconsequential if the evidentiary products of pretrial deprivations are lib-
erally admitted at trial. Finally, the narrow question raised in Fellers affords a unique
occasion to examine the somewhat murky underpinnings of the Elstad doctrine and
* Edward A. Howrey Professor of Law, University of Iowa College of Law. I owe an
enormous debt of gratitude to Tom O'Brien and John Pantazis for outstanding assistance in
the preparation of this Article and to Michael Sarabia and Christopher Moseng for ensuring
the quality of the final product. I am also indebted to the University of Iowa for a develop-
mental leave that was instrumental to the completion of this piece.
540 U.S. 519 (2004).
2 Id. at 523-24.
3id.
4 Id. at 525.
470 U.S. 298 (1985).
6 Fellers, 540 U.S. at 525.
7 See James J. Tomkovicz, Reaffirming the Right to PretrialAssistance: The Surprising
Little Case of Fellers v. United States, 15 WM. &MARY BILL RTs. J. 501 (2006) [hereinafter,
Tomkovicz, Pretrial Assistance].
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the long-neglected justifications for Sixth Amendment exclusion. This examination
yields useful insights into both the Miranda and Massiah doctrines and highlights crit-
ical differences between their respective "exclusionary rules."
Part I of this Article includes a brief review of the Fellers case, summarizing the
proceedings that occurred prior to the Eighth Circuit's second opinion on remand from
the Supreme Court. It then undertakes a detailed explanation of the Eighth Circuit's
second effort to resolve Fellers's claim. In Part II, I explore and analyze the question
that was remanded. After pausing to comment upon the Supreme Court's decision not
to confront the exclusionary rule issue, I explore the landmark opinion in Elstad and
the insights into Elstad and Miranda exclusion furnished by a trio of Supreme Court
opinions-those in Dickerson v. United States,8 Missouri v. Seibert,9 and United States
v. Patane.'° I next discuss the underpinnings of Sixth Amendment based exclusion,
documenting the unclarity and uncertainty generated by Supreme Court opinions and
offering an explanation that is consistent with the essence of the pretrial guarantee of
assistance afforded by the Massiah doctrine. With these premises all in place, it is
possible to analyze the logic of the Eighth Circuit's remand opinion and to determine
whether Elstad should, in fact, apply to Sixth Amendment deprivations.
I. THE UPS AND DOWNS OF FELLERS V. UNITED STATES
This preliminary section tersely describes the history of Fellers from the time
of the indictment through the Supreme Court's reversal and remand. It then spends
considerable time illuminating the Eighth Circuit's elaborate opinion on remand, an
opinion that the Supreme Court declined to review.
A. The Road from Indictment to Supreme Court Reversal
John Fellers was indicted in federal court for conspiracy to distribute metham-
phetamine.l" The officers who went to Fellers's home to arrest him explained that the
indictment described his involvement with other individuals and named four such per-
sons. 2 Fellers responded "that he knew the four people and had used methamphet-
amine during his association with them.' 13 Later, at the county jail, officers delivered
Miranda warnings.'4 Fellers waived his rights, repeated the incriminating admissions
he made in his home, and made a number of additional inculpatory statements. 5
8 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
9 542 U.S. 600 (2004).
10 542 U.S. 630 (2004).
'1 Fellers, 540 U.S. at 521.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 id.
"5 Id. at 521-22.
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Before trial, Fellers moved to suppress all of his inculpatory statements. 16 A fed-
eral magistrate ruled that the statements made at his home should be suppressed be-
cause of the officers' "deceptive stratagems" and that the jailhouse admissions should
also be excluded because they "would not have been made but for the prior ill-gotten
statements.' 7 The district court judge agreed that the in-home statements had to be
excluded from trial, but decided that thejailhouse statements were admissible pursuant
to Oregon v. Elstad. 8 After a trial in which the prosecution introduced the jailhouse
statements, a jury convicted Fellers of conspiracy to possess methamphetamine with
intent to distribute it.19
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit sustained the district court's refusal to suppress the
jailhouse statements and affirmed Fellers's conviction.20 Two judges thought that the
Sixth Amendment counsel guarantee did not apply during the encounter at Fellers's
home because "the officers did not interrogate" him. 2' They also concluded that the
record supported the district court's finding that the "jailhouse statements were know-
ingly and voluntarily made following the administration of the Miranda warning. ,22
Consequently, the statements made at the jail were properly admitted at trial.23
A concurring judge disagreed with the conclusion that the officers' interaction with
the accused had not triggered an entitlement to the assistance of counsel. 24 He none-
theless agreed that the jailhouse statements were admissible, believing that Oregon v.
Elstad dictated that conclusion.25
Fellers successfully sought a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court.26 A unani-
mous Court opined that it had "consistently" adhered to "the deliberate-elicitation
standard in ... Sixth Amendment cases. '27 The Eighth Circuit, therefore, had erred
in concluding that the "absence of an 'interrogation"' precluded a Sixth Amendment
violation and "foreclosed [Fellers's] claim that the jailhouse statements" had to be ex-
cluded as the "fruits of the statements taken from [Fellers] at his home., 28 Because
Fellers had been indicted, his Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached.29 When
the officers came to his home, "informed him that their purpose... was to discuss
16 Id. at 522.
1" United States v. Fellers, 285 F.3d 721,723 (8th Cir. 2002), rev'd, 540 U.S. 519 (2004),
aff'd, 397 F.3d 1090 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 415 (2005).
18 Fellers, 540 U.S. at 522.
19 Id.
20 Fellers, 285 F.3d at 723.
21 Id. at 724 (emphasis added).
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 726-27 (Riley, J., concurring).
25 Id. at 727.
26 Fellers v. United States, 538 U.S. 905 (2003).
27 Fellers v. United States, 540 U.S. 519,524 (2004). For support, the Court cited United
States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 270 (1980), and Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 399 (1977).
28 Fellers, 540 U.S. at 524.
29 id.
20071
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
his involvement" in methamphetamine distribution "and his association with certain
charged co-conspirators," and then discussed these matters with him, they "'deliber-
ately elicited' information" from the accused in violation of "the Sixth Amendment
standards established in Massiah ... and its progeny."30
According to Justice O'Connor, the Eighth Circuit's Sixth Amendment error
caused it to "improperly conduct[] its 'fruits' analysis under the Fifth Amendment."3
As a result, the court had "not reach[ed] the question whether the Sixth Amendment
requires suppression of [the] jailhouse statements" as "the fruits of... questioning...
in violation of the Sixth Amendment deliberate-elicitation standard."32 For this rea-
son, and because the Supreme Court itself had not yet addressed whether the Elstad
rule applies to Sixth Amendment deprivations, it remanded that question to the Eighth
Circuit, affording that court the first opportunity to untangle this thorny issue.33
B. The Court of Appeals Opinion on Remand
It took the Eighth Circuit approximately one year to resolve the remanded question.
In mid-February 2005, that court held that the statements Fellers made at the jail were
admissible under the Elstad doctrine. 4 While the court's conclusion was the same as
in its first opinion, the nature and quantity of the supportive reasoning were dramati-
cally different this time. The opinion on remand reflects a conscientious effort to come
to grips with Elstad's relevance to Sixth Amendment transgressions.35
Fellers argued that the Elstad rule should not control because it "was never de-
signed to deal with actual violations of the Constitution" and "is ill-suited to serve the
distinct concerns raised by the Sixth Amendment. '36 In his view, the Miranda vio-
lations that the Elstad rule was "crafted to serve" are "fundamentally different from
the Sixth Amendment violation" in his case.37 The appellate court disagreed with
his contentions.38
30 Id. at 524-25.
" Id. at 525.
32 Id. (emphasis added).
33 id.
34 United States v. Fellers, 397 F.3d 1090, 1095-97 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S.
Ct. 415 (2005).
3' The painstakingly thorough opinion gives the impression of a court that is determined
to cover every base this time, dotting every "i" and crossing every "t" along the way. The
opinion does not concede that the court's initial discussion of Elstad's impact rested on a faulty
foundation. It seems entirely possible that the court believed it was merely redoing what it
had already done-resolving the question of Elstad's application to Sixth Amendment depri-
vations. As will be discussed later, it is not at all clear that the first Eighth Circuit opinion rested
on the defective Fifth Amendment foundation that the Supreme Court discerned. See infra
notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
36 Fellers, 397 F.3d at 1093.
37 id.
38 Id.
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The court devoted considerable effort to explaining the Elstad doctrine, its original
premises, and the impact of Dickerson v. United States 39 on that doctrine. According
to the court, although Dickerson "undercut" one "justification for Elstad's holding,"
it reaffirmed the validity of the Elstad rule.' The court acknowledged that the deter-
mination of "[w]hether the exclusionary rule applies to evidence acquired subsequent
to a constitutional violation requires consideration of the.. . 'distinct policies and
interests' of each Amendment."' It then announced an apparently general rule that
confessions secured after improper conduct are excluded "unless they result from an
'intervening act of free will' by the suspect. ' 42
The Eighth Circuit observed that although the exclusionary rule is most frequently
applied in cases involving Fourth Amendment violations, it also applies to Fifth and
Sixth Amendment transgressions.43 According to the court, the Supreme Court has
"repeatedly noted.., that the core reason for extending the exclusionary rule to [Fifth
and Sixth Amendment contexts] is to deter police from violating constitutional and
statutory protections." Nonetheless, "[a]nother relevant consideration... is whether
[the exclusion of evidence] would effectuate the purposes of the constitutional pro-
vision at issue" in a particular case.45
Before turning to the Sixth Amendment rule involved in Fellers, the court con-
trasted the application of the Fourth and Fifth Amendment exclusionary rules to
39 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
40 Fellers, 397 F.3d at 1094. According to the court, Elstad was originally "premised on
the fact that a violation of Miranda was not, by itself, a violation of the Fifth Amendment
and on the fact that the protections afforded by the Miranda rule sweep more broadly than
the Fifth Amendment itself." Id. The court apparently believed that Dickerson's holding that
Miranda is a constitutionally rooted doctrine was inconsistent with and, therefore, "undercut"
this "justification." Id. In the Eighth Circuit's view, Dickerson "held that Elstad's rationale
rested not on the fact that Miranda was not a constitutionally mandated rule, but instead on
the fact that unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment are different from unwarned
interrogation under the Fifth Amendment." Id. The Court's decision in United States v. Patane
made it clear that Dickerson did not contradict or even modify any of Elstad' s underpinnings.
See United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630,640-41 (2004) (plurality opinion) (indicating that
Dickerson did not undermine the validity or the logic of Elstad and other pre-Dickerson opin-
ions explaining the premises that underlie Miranda); id. at 645 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment) (agreeing that Dickerson "did not undermine" Elstad). The Elstad Court did not rest
its conclusion on the premise that Miranda has no constitutional foundation. Instead, it asserted
that Miranda's presumption of compulsion was somewhat overprotective, requiring suppres-
sion of some statements that are not, in fact, compelled and that Miranda violations are not
necessarily violations of the Fifth Amendment privilege. Those premises survived Dickerson
unscathed and are alive and well today.
41 Fellers, 397 F.3d at 1094.
42 Id. (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 486 (1963)).
43 Id.
44 Id. (emphasis added).
45 Id.
2007]
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confessions alleged to be the "fruits" of illegality.4 6 According to the court of ap-
peals, when a confession is obtained as a result of a failure to abide by the Fourth
Amendment, "courts apply the exclusionary rule to ensure that the confession is not
causally linked to the initial illegality., 47 The mere intervening delivery of Miranda
warnings does not establish "an act of free will sufficient to break the causal con-
nection between the violation and the confession" and does not guarantee that the un-
constitutionality has not been unduly exploited.48 On the other hand, when the official
transgression is a failure to warn in violation of Miranda' s Fifth Amendment based
dictates, the Elstad doctrine holds that a subsequent statement following the Miranda
warnings is "normally viewed as" the product of "an 'act of free will"' sufficient to
justify admission of that statement.49 The reason for this differential treatment is the
nature of the Fifth Amendment's core concerns-preventing the use of "compelled
testimony" and "ensur[ing] that any evidence introduced at trial will be voluntary and
thus trustworthy."5 Despite an initial failure to warn, the introduction of a statement
made after complete Miranda warnings and a valid waiver "entails no risk that com-
pelled testimony will be used against a suspect.' 51 Consequently, suppression of such
a statement "neither deters violations of the Fifth Amendment nor ensures that the
statement was not compelled" and "the ordinary exclusionary rule gives way to the
Elstad rule" of admissibility.52
In the court's view, the Massiah doctrine's prohibition on "the use at trial of
statements deliberately elicited" after indictment "serves to exclude uncounseled post-
indictment statements taken in violation of the Sixth Amendment and thereby pre-
serves the integrity and fairness of the criminal trial. 53 The Fifth Amendment based
Elstad doctrine governed the Sixth Amendment violation in Fellers because the ex-
clusion of the statements made after the officers satisfied Massiah's requirements
"would serve neither deterrence nor any other goal of the Sixth Amendment. 5 4 In
Fellers, the officers did not refer to the uncounseled, in-home statements to "prompt"
the incriminating jailhouse statements.55 Moreover, they would have had a basis for
the jailhouse questioning even if Fellers had not made prior statements, and the content
of the defendant's jailhouse statements went well beyond the content of the initial,
46 Id. at 1094-95.
47 Id. at 1095.
48 Id.
49 id.
5 Id. (citing Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306-08 (1985)).
51 Id.
52 Id. After United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004), it is quite incorrect to conclude
that there is an "ordinary exclusionary rule" for any "fruits" of statements acquired in violation
of Miranda. Because no derivative evidence is subject to exclusion, there is an ordinary, appar-
ently inflexible, admissibility rule.
13 Fellers, 397 F.3d at 1095.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 1095-96.
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in-home statements obtained in violation of Massiah's standards.56 For these reasons,
the introduction of the jailhouse statements "was not unfair to Fellers.""
According to the Eighth Circuit, it is a general, "historical" principle that "evi-
dence acquired after a Sixth Amendment violation is excluded in the absence of proof
that the Sixth Amendment violation did not contribute to or produce the subsequent
evidence."" The introduction of Fellers's jailhouse statements was deemed fully con-
sistent with this principle. 9 Despite the initial failure either to warn him or to ensure
counsel's presence, Fellers was given Miranda warnings prior to his jailhouse state-
ments.' His subsequent "knowing, intelligent, and voluntary choice to waive his right
to counsel constitute[d] an intervening act of free will that [broke] the causal link be-
tween the prior uncounseled statements.., and the subsequent statements. ''61
The court found further support for its conclusion that the Elstad rule extends to
Sixth Amendment violations in the Supreme Court's emphasis on "the similarity be-
tween pre-indictment suspects subjected to custodial interrogation and post-indictment
defendants subjected to questioning. 62 Specifically, in Patterson v. Illinois,63 the
majority had recognized that "there is no significant difference between a lawyer's
usefulness to a suspect" in pre-indictment and post-indictment contexts and held that
Miranda warnings generally provide sufficient information for a waiver of Massiah' s
Sixth Amendment right to counsel.'
16 See id. at 1096.
57 Id.
58 Id. The court found this principle reflected in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218
(1967). Wade held that if the government stages a post-indictment lineup without counsel,
any subsequent, in-court identification of the accused by the same witness is inadmissible
unless the government demonstrates, by clear and convincing evidence, that its origin was
independent of the lineup-i.e., that the witness's in-court identification is based on obser-
vations of the accused other than those at the lineup. Id. at 239-40.
19 Fellers, 397 F.3d at 1095-96.
60 Id. at 1097.
61 Id. at 1096.
62 Id.
63 487 U.S. 285 (1988).
64 Fellers, 397 F.3d at 1096-97 (citing Patterson, 487 U.S. at 293-94, 298-99). The Eighth
Circuit found an additional acknowledgment of the similarity of Miranda and Massiah trans-
gressions in the Court's conclusion that, like statements "taken in violation of Miranda, un-
counseled statements obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment may be used at trial for
impeachment purposes." Id. at 1097. In fact, the Court has not yet decided whether statements
obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment are generally admissible to impeach a defendant.
Instead, the Court has narrowly held that for one particular type of Massiah violation impeach-
ment use is permissible, leaving the question of impeachment use unresolved for other types
of Sixth Amendment transgressions. See Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 345-46 (1990)
(concluding that statements obtained in violation of the prophylactic safeguard that applies
after an accused requests counsel are admissible to impeach the accused's testimony). It seems
fair to say that a prime reason why the Court eschewed a broader holding regarding the
permissibility of impeachment under Massiah is that the rationales for Sixth Amendment
exclusion are ordinarily distinct from the rationales for exclusion under Miranda.
2007]
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The court found no merit in the argument that the "psychological effect" of the
statement that was improperly secured "inherently taints the second statement or co-
erces a post-indictment accused into expanding upon statements previously made
because the first statement 'let the cat out of the bag."65 The Elstad Court "squarely
rejected" that same argument under Miranda, and the similarities between Fifth
and Sixth Amendment settings made the Elstad "analysis ... equally applicable in"
Fellers.' Just as in an analogous situation involving a Miranda violation, "the con-
dition that made [Fellers's initial] statements inadmissible.., was removed" by the
full warnings and valid waiver made prior to his jailhouse admissions.67
The court concluded its exhaustive reasoning by considering whether admission
of thejailhouse statements was consistent with the Court's 2004 qualification of Elstad
in Missouri v. Seibert.68 In Seibert, a majority held that in some circumstances Miranda
warnings that follow initial Miranda violations are ineffective.69 According to the
Eighth Circuit, under both the Seibert plurality's multi-factor test and the standard de-
veloped in Justice Kennedy's concurrence, the conduct of the officers in Fellers did
not "vitiate the effectiveness of the Miranda warnings given" to the accused.7 ° The
officers provided Fellers with the information necessary to choose whether he wished
to make additional incriminating statements. 7'
1I. THE ROAD NOT TRAVELED BY THE SUPREME COURT: SHOULD OREGON V.
ELSTAD GOVERN SIXTH AMENDMENT EXCLUSION?
72
This section analyzes the Sixth Amendment exclusionary rule issue that the
Supreme Court remanded and the Eighth Circuit decided. Initially, I reflect upon
65 Fellers, 397 F.3d at 1097 n.2.
6 Id.
67 Id. at 1097.
68 Id. at 1098 (discussing Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004)).
69 Seibert, 542 U.S. at 612-13 (emphasis added).
70 Fellers, 397 F.3dat 1097-98. The Court applied both the four Justice plurality standard
and Justice Kennedy's separate standard because Justice Kennedy's vote was essential to the
outcome and holding in Seibert. In fact, his narrower specification of the circumstances in
which Miranda warnings ought to be deemed ineffective to accomplish their purposes pre-
scribes the governing law. See infra text accompanying notes 164-76.
7' Fellers, 397 F.3d at 1097. For good measure, and perhaps to insulate its holding from
reversal even if its analysis of the Sixth Amendment exclusionary rule issue proved faulty, the
court added that the admission of the jailhouse statements "was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt." id. at 1098. It is clear that the admission of evidence in violation of the Massiah doc-
trine can be a harmless constitutional error. See Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371,372 (1972).
72 As noted earlier, the Court refused to address the exclusionary rule issue the first time,
remanding it to the Eighth Circuit. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text. After that
court's decision, the Supreme Court again refused to address the question, denying Fellers's
petition for review. Fellers v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 415 (2005).
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the Court's decision not to analyze the applicability of the Elstad rule to Sixth Amend-
ment deprivations. I then examine at length the reasoning and premises that support
the Elstad doctrine, discussing not only Elstad itself, but subsequent opinions that
have shed light on its meaning. After that, I turn my attention to the Massiah doc-
trine' s Sixth Amendment exclusionary rule in an effort to ascertain and describe its
underlying logic and rationales. With a complete foundation in place, I turn, at last,
to the central question-whether extension of the rule of Oregon v. Elstad to Sixth
Amendment contexts is constitutionally defensible.
A. The Decision Not to Address the Exclusionary Rule Issue: The Court Steers
Around the Massiah-Elstad Collision
As already noted, Fellers presented the Court with two separable but related ques-
tions. Both were fully briefed and argued. The first was whether the officers' conduct
at the accused's home even implicated his right to counsel-i.e., whether the offi-
cers engaged in conduct that the Sixth Amendment entitlement to legal assistance pro-
vides shelter against. The second question-based on the assumption that there was
an initial Sixth Amendment transgression-was whether the statements the accused
made later at the jail were admissible under the rule of Oregon v. Elstad. It seemed
likely that the Court would quickly dispense with the first question, ruling in Fellers's
favor and would then devote primary attention to the exclusionary rule issue.73 The
Court did exactly as expected with regard to the substantive Sixth Amendment issue,
but then sidestepped the much more interesting, challenging, and complex exclusionary
rule question.
There is nothing astounding about a Supreme Court decision not to address an issue
on which it has granted review. The decision to avoid the Elstad question in Fellers,
however, was somewhat surprising because it required, at best, a strained reading of
the Eighth Circuit's initial opinion. According to the Court, a remand was in order be-
cause the lower court's opinion simply had not addressed the issue.74 Instead, because
the Eighth Circuit majority had erroneously concluded that the absence of interrogation
71 Most observers surely thought that the second question was the one that really merited
Supreme Court review. The parties' briefs reflected an expectation that the exclusionary rule
question would be the focus of most attention and concern by the Court. Fellers's initial brief
devoted approximately seven pages to the first issue and approximately twenty-five to the
second. See Brief for Petitioner, Fellers v. United States, 540 U.S. 519 (2004) (No. 02-6320).
His reply brief devoted three pages to the first issue and nearly sixteen to the second. See
Reply Brief for Petitioner, Fellers, 540 U.S. 519. The United States's brief devoted roughly
nine pages to the first issue and nearly twenty-eight to the second. See Brief for the United
States, Fellers, 540 U.S. 519.
71 See Fellers, 540 U.S. at 525. The other reason for the remand was that the Justices
themselves had never addressed the applicability of Elstad to Sixth Amendment depriva-
tions. See id.
2007]
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precluded a Massiah violation, it had "improperly conducted its 'fruits' analysis under
the Fifth Amendment.,
75
The Eighth Circuit's apparent conclusion that the officers' failure to interrogate
defeated Fellers's Sixth Amendment claim did provide a logical basis for inferring that
the court had not conducted a Sixth Amendment based exclusionary rule analysis.76
On the other hand, without interrogation (or custody, for that matter), Miranda' s Fifth
Amendment doctrine was entirely, unarguably inapposite. The Eighth Circuit had posi-
tively no reason to conduct a Fifth Amendment "fruits" analysis, and its terse opinion
contains no overt indication that its discussion of Elstad was rooted in or confined to
the Fifth Amendment context.77 Because a Miranda claim lacked any possible merit
75 id.
76 I say "apparent" conclusion because of the somewhat opaque and contradictory nature
of the court's reasoning. The majority opinion first "conclude[d] that Oregon v. Elstad...
render[ed] admissible the statements made by Fellers at the jail." United States v. Fellers, 285
F.3d 721, 724 (8th Cir. 2002), rev'd, 540 U.S. 519 (2004). Because the Elstad doctrine
governs successive confessionsfollowing an initial impropriety, there would be no reason to
rely upon it unless an initial violation of some sort had occurred. The court then observed that
Fellers relied upon Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285 (1988), to support his argument that "the
officers' failure to administer Miranda warnings at his home violated his [S]ixth [Almend-
ment right to counsel." Fellers, 285 F.3d at 724. The court responded that "Patterson [was]
not applicable.., for the officers did not interrogate Fellers at his home." Id. Although the
court did not explicitly state that the right to counsel hinges on official interrogation, the
declaration that Patterson was "not applicable" because the officers "did not interrogate
Fellers" surely was an indirect way of expressing that conclusion. Id. Patterson is a Sixth
Amendment Massiah doctrine holding that Miranda warnings contain most if not all of the
information needed for a knowing waiver of the right to counsel. Patterson, 487 U.S. at
292-93. By deeming it inapplicable, the court was indicating that the officers conduct was
insufficient to require a valid waiver of the right to assistance. In other words, it had not given
rise to any entitlement to counsel. That alone would have been a more than adequate basis
for declaring any and all statements made by Fellers to be admissible. The court, however, pro-
ceeded to obfuscate its reasoning by then concluding that "the district court did not err in"
refusing to suppress the jailhouse statements because "the record amply support[ed] the...
finding that [those] statements were knowingly and voluntarily made following... Miranda
warning[s]." Fellers, 285 F.3d at 724. The court cited Elstad for support. Id. Once again, there
was no reason to rely on Elstad to justify admission of the jailhouse statements if there was
no transgression during the encounter at Fellers's home. Any effort to explain these incon-
sistencies by inferring that the court was denying a right to counsel violation but affirming a
Miranda violation founders on the fact that "interrogation" is an invariable predicate for
Miranda protection.
In sum, although the Eighth Circuit did assert, albeit somewhat obliquely, that the absence
of interrogation at his home defeated Fellers's Sixth Amendment claim, the court twice ex-
plained the admissibility of the jailhouse statements on a basis that assumed the existence of
an official impropriety during the in-home encounter. Logical reconciliation of the court's
premises seems impossible.
" The description of the progress of the case in the decision on remand suggests that the
Eighth Circuit itself may not have agreed with the Supreme Court's characterization of its
initial opinion. The court observed that it had previously "upheld Fellers's conviction against
[Vol. 15:711
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and because Fellers had argued that the failure to warn him "violated his [S]ixth
[A]mendment right to counsel, 78 perhaps a more logical interpretation of the lower
court's reasoning was that it first found no right to counsel deprivation, then concluded
that even if there had been a Sixth Amendment transgression, the jailhouse statements
were immune from suppression under Elstad. In other words, it seems likely that the
Eighth Circuit's ambiguous discussion of Elstad was, in fact, grounded in the Sixth
Amendment, not in Miranda's patently irrelevant Fifth Amendment doctrine.
The Supreme Court's questionable characterization of the lower court's logic
suggests a deliberate decision to avoid the Sixth Amendment exclusionary rule issue
despite a thorough adversarial presentation of the arguments. Presented with oppor-
tunities not only to provide a definitive answer to the narrow Elstad question, but also
to fill a serious void by explaining the rationales for Sixth Amendment-Massiah doc-
trine suppression, and, thereby, to furnish guidance for the resolution of other Sixth
Amendment exclusionary rule issues, the Court opted to give the court of appeals the
first chance to address the question.79
It is undeniably risky to speculate about the meaning of the Court's cautious han-
dling of Fellers. Nonetheless, it is at least possible, perhaps even likely, that the de-
cision to bypass the Sixth Amendment-Elstad question evinces a genuinely open mind
about Elstad's relevance to Massiah violations.80 After all, the Justices all joined an
opinion emphasizing that Sixth Amendment "fruits" analysis is distinct from Fifth
Amendment "fruits" analysis. Moreover, if a majority had been convinced that Elstad
governs, there would have been no good reason for its questionable interpretation of
the lower court's reasoning. In addition, Justice O'Connor' s opinion lacks the slightest
hint about the merits of the remanded question. The absence of any effort to guide or
influence the lower court's resolution could be further evidence of genuine indecision. 8'
Fifth and Sixth Amendment challenges and held that Fellers'sjailhouse statements were admis-
sible under Oregon v. Elstad." United States v. Fellers, 397 F.3d 1090, 1093 (8th Cir. 2005),
cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 415 (2005). It then noted that the "Supreme Court reversed our deci-
sion and concluded that the officers had deliberately elicited the statements made at Fellers's
home in violation of Fellers's Sixth Amendment right to counsel" before remanding the ques-
tion of whether Elstad' s rationale applies to Sixth Amendment violations. Id. At no point did
the court acknowledge that the reliance on and discussion of Elstad in its initial opinion had
been a misguided Fifth Amendment fruits analysis rather than a confusing Sixth Amendment
fruits analysis.
78 Fellers, 285 F.3d at 724 (basing his argument on Patterson, 487 U.S. 285, a Sixth
Amendment Massiah doctrine precedent).
" Because the Court did not grant review of the Second Circuit court decision, the effect
of the remand was to give the Eighth Circuit not only the first but the final word on the
subject-at least for now. Perhaps this outcome was predictable in light of the Court's past
hesitation to wade far into Sixth Amendment exclusionary rule waters. See infra text accom-
panying notes 225-71.
80 The intent is not to suggest that all of the Justices are undecided about Elstad's appli-
cation to Sixth Amendment deprivations but, rather, that a determinative number of Justices
may well be open to persuasion on the question.
81 On the other hand, I suppose it is possible that the Justices, early on, discovered a way they
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As noted, the Eighth Circuit had no doubt that Elstad does apply to deprivations
of the right to counsel. Whether that conclusion can withstand constitutional scrutiny
depends, in part, on the character of the Elstad doctrine and, in part, on the character
of the Sixth Amendment "exclusionary rule." I turn first to an in-depth exploration
of Elstad.
B. The Meaning and Significance of Oregon v. Elstad
1. The Holding and Reasoning of the Elstad Majority: Why Miranda Doesn't
Care Whether the Cat Is out of the Bag
Oregon v. Elstad82 has proven to have major theoretical and practical significance
for Miranda law. Its conception of the rationales for Miranda suppression has pro-
vided a foundation for limiting that landmark's practical consequences, a foundation
likely to have lasting impact. Its holding that unwarned custodial interrogation that
yields admissions ordinarily provides no basis for excluding "successive" statements-
those made following compliance with Miranda's dictates83-- diminishes the signifi-
cance of a Miranda violation' and expands the power to effectively investigate and
successfully prosecute.
In Elstad, officers went to a young man's home to investigate a burglary.85
While the suspect was still in his home, an officer interrogated him and secured an
might dodge the exclusionary rule question and decided to exercise that option, giving little real
thought to whether a different outcome might really be warranted under the Sixth Amendment.
82 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
83 Id. at 306-07.
84 The Elstad majority specifically and repeatedly limited its holding to Miranda violations
of the "failure to warn" variety. See, e.g., id. at 307-08, 310-11, 312. It seems likely that
Elstad's logic and its principle of admissibility would be extended to situations in which an
initial statement results not from a failure to warn, but from an invalid waiver of rights, and a
successive statement is made after full compliance with Miranda's dictates. The Elstad majority
did declare "inapposite" cases that involved "suspects whose invocation of their rights to re-
main silent and to have counsel present were flatly ignored while police subjected them to con-
tinued interrogation." Id. at 313 n.3. One analytical problem in such cases is that after officers
have failed to honor the additional doctrinal safeguards that arise upon a suspect's invocation
of either right, it may be difficult for them to later comply with Miranda's dictates. In other
words, if officers fail to "scrupulously honor[]" the right to cut off questioning, see Michigan
v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 103 (1975), or if they "initiate communications" following a clear
request for counsel, see Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477,484-85 (1981), they may not be
able to eliminate the effects of their impropriety and conduct a custodial interrogation that
does adhere to Miranda's commands. Assuming that either time or curative steps can clean the
slate and enable officers to satisfy Miranda at a subsequent session, the Elstad principle-
that a successive confession is not tainted by the earlier violation and initial confession-may
well apply.
85 Elstad, 470 U.S. at 300.
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incriminating admission. 6 Shortly thereafter, at the police station, the suspect was
given complete Miranda warnings, waived his rights, and responded to interrogation
with additional admissions. 8 7 The Oregon Court of Appeals concluded that the
Miranda violation dictated exclusion of both the initial confession and the post-
warning statements.88 In its view, the improperly obtained admission had "let the cat
out of the bag."89 The resulting psychological impact upon the suspect-his aware-
ness that he had already confessed his guilt to the officers--"impaired [his] ability
to give a valid waiver." 9 According to the Oregon court, when officers initially fail
to warn a suspect, obtain an inadmissible confession, then comply with Miranda's
requirements and secure a successive confession, the latter is presumptively barred
from trial.9 Exclusion is necessary unless the prosecution proves that intervening
events-the passage of time and a change in location, for example--'"dissipate[d]...
the 'coercive impact' of the inadmissible statement."92
Six Justices disagreed with this reasoning. In an opinion authored by Justice
O'Connor, they concluded that the initial Miranda violation did not justify sup-
pression of Elstad's post-warning statement.93 Rather, the intervening adherence to
Miranda had cured the Fifth Amendment infirmity and rendered the second state-
ment admissible.9' The majority offered an array of reasons for its holding that the
Miranda exclusionary doctrine does not encompass such a successive confession. To
determine whether Elstad should govern right to counsel deprivations, it is critical
to identify and explain the Court's logic.
95
86 Id. at 301. The Court intimated that whether the suspect was in custody at the time was
a debatable question and that the officer's failure to warn was an "oversight" that "may have
been the result of confusion" about whether he was conducting a custodial interrogation. Id.
at 315-16. The plurality in Missouri v. Seibert relied on this characterization of the encounter
in concluding that "it is fair to read Elstad as treating the living room conversation [between
the officer and suspect] as a good-faith Miranda mistake .... open to correction by careful
warnings." See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600,615 (2004) (plurality opinion). The "good-
faith" nature of the violation was among the reasons the Seibert plurality later found that
Elstad did not govern deliberate strategic decisions to neglect Miranda warnings-the
situation at issue in Seibert. Id. at 616; see also id. at 619-20 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment) (highlighting the distinction between Elstad, in which it was "not clear whether
the suspect was in custody," and Seibert, which involved "a deliberate violation of Miranda"
used "to obscure.., the... significance" of warnings).
87 Elstad, 470 U.S. at 301.
88 Id. at 303, 309-10.
89 Id. at311.
90 Id. at 310.
9' Id. at 303, 310.
92 Id. at 310.
93 Id. at 300.
94 Id. at 310-11, 314.
" I agree with Justice Stevens that the reasoning of the majority opinion is, at least at times,
"opaque." See id. at 365 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The effort here is to explain the underlying
premises as clearly as possible. Fortunately, some clarifying insights have been provided by
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One important premise was that Miranda had "required suppression of many state-
ments that would have been admissible under [the] traditional due process" coerced
confession doctrine.96 By "presuming that statements made while in custody and with-
out adequate warnings were protected by the Fifth Amendment,"97 the Miranda
Court had erected a significant and novel impediment to the government's freedom
to use confessions to convict. Another key underpinning of Elstad was that the Fourth
Amendment's "'fruit of the poisonous tree"' doctrine, which presumptively bars all
evidence with a causal connection to government misconduct, "assumes the existence
of a constitutional violation.' '98 In other words, it dictates the exclusion of derivative
evidence" only for those official, out-of-court improprieties that actually violate con-
stitutional rights. Because a "procedural Miranda violation" is not itself a violation
of the Fifth Amendment, there is no "mandate[]" for "a broad application of the 'fruits'
doctrine" to Miranda transgressions.'00
The Elstad Court did acknowledge that Miranda's "exclusionary rule ... serves
the Fifth Amendment," but it asserted that the Miranda rule "sweeps more broadly
than the Fifth Amendment itself" and "may be triggered even in the absence of a Fifth
Amendment violation."'0 ' This is so because "[a] Miranda violation does not consti-
tute coercion but rather affords a bright-line, legal presumption of coercion, requiring
suppression of all unwamed statements."'0 2 In other words, the presumption estab-
lished by Miranda, which renders inadmissible all statements made during unwamed
custodial interrogation, results in the suppression of some statements that are not
subsequent opinions.
96 Id. at 304 (majority opinion). Prior to Miranda, the Due Process Clause was the source
of constitutional protection against convictions based on confessions produced by official
coercion. Confessions were inadmissible if, in the totality of the circumstances, the suspect's
will had been overborne. See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 323 (1959). The Court first
declared a confession inadmissible on due process grounds in Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S.
278, 286 (1936). In the three decades between that ruling and Miranda, the Court had ex-
plained, applied, and developed the due process-coerced confession doctrine in numerous
cases. See, e.g., Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S.
560 (1958); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219
(1941). The relevant circumstances identified by the Court included not only the pressures
brought to bear by the authorities, but the characteristics of the suspect that made him more
susceptible to those pressures. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428,434 (2000) ('The
due process test takes into consideration 'the totality of all the surrounding circumstances-
both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation."' (quoting
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973))).
97 Elstad, 470 U.S. at 304.
98 Id. at 305 (emphasis added).
'9 "Primary" evidence is evidence secured as the immediate result of an unconstitutionality
or other impropriety. "Derivative" evidence is evidence that is subsequently acquired as a result
of a short or long chain of events causally linked to the initial transgression.
lOO Elstad, 470 U.S. at 306.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 307 n. 1 (second emphasis added).
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actually compelled, and, therefore, are not in fact forbidden by the Fifth Amendment
privilege.'°3 When a voluntary (not compelled) statement is kept from the courtroom,
"Miranda's preventive medicine provides a remedy ... to the defendant who has
suffered no identifiable constitutional harm."'1 4
The Elstad majority declared that Miranda's overbroad presumption "does not
require" that the fruits of inadmissible statements "be discarded as inherently tainted,"' 05
finding ample support for this proposition in Michigan v. Tucker.'°6 In Tucker, a wit-
ness was discovered as a result of statements a suspect made without receiving com-
plete Miranda warnings.'0 7 The admissibility of the witness's testimony was at issue.° 8
According to Elstad, because "there was no actual infringement of the suspect's con-
stitutional rights" but only a violation of Miranda's prophylactic dictates, "the case
was not controlled by the doctrine ... that fruits of a constitutional violation must be
suppressed."' 9 To determine whether the fruit of a Miranda violation-in this case,
the witness's testimony-had to be suppressed, the Tucker majority was guided by the
two ostensible purposes for exclusion under Miranda: the "general goal of deterring
improper police conduct" and "the Fifth Amendment goal of assuring trustworthy evi-
dence."' 0 Because exclusion of the witness's testimony would have furthered neither
objective, the Tucker Court "ruled that introduction of [that] testimony did not violate"
the Fifth Amendment and declared it admissible.'
"' Not long before the opinion in Elstad, the Court relied on this very same distinction
to create a "public safety" exception to Miranda. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654,
655 n.5 (1984) (distinguishing between statements that are "actually compelled" and those
that "must be presumed compelled" because of a failure to give Miranda warnings).
'o4 Elstad, 470 U.S. at 307. Justice O'Connor apparently meant that the suspect had suffered
no constitutional rights deprivation during custodial interrogation and would suffer no such
deprivation if his statements were to be admitted at trial.
1"5 Id. The Court also observed that statements themselves are not discarded as inherently
tainted. Support for that proposition was found in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971),
which held that statements obtained without proper warnings may be used to impeach an
accused's inconsistent direct testimony. Id. at 226.
106 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
107 Id. at 436.
'01 id. at 435.
109 Elstad, 470 U.S. at 308.
"o Id. Later, I question the Court's restrictive description of the second goal as "trust-
worthiness" alone. See infra note 212.
"' Elstad, 470 U.S. at 308. The Fifth Amendment goal of assuring trustworthy evidence
was not threatened because the failure to warn the suspect and provide a safeguard against
the compulsion produced by custodial interrogation did not generate any risk that the third-
party witness's testimony would in any way be unreliable-i.e., that it would misleadingly,
inaccurately inculpate the accused and yield injustice. See Tucker, 417 U.S. at 449. The ob-
jective of deterring failures to adhere to Miranda was not undermined because that goal
"necessarily assumes ... willful, or at the very least negligent, conduct" by officers. Id. at
447. "[T]he deterrence rationale" for suppressing evidence "loses much of its force" in cases
involving "good faith" violations by officers. Id. In Tucker, there could be no doubt that the
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Having construed Tucker expansively, the Elstad majority announced that that
opinion's "reasoning" about the scope of Miranda exclusion "applies with equal force
when the alleged 'fruit' of a noncoercive Miranda violation is neither a witness nor an
article of evidence but the accused's own voluntary testimony."'"2 According to Justice
O'Connor, the "twin rationales" for a "broader [exclusionary] rule"--"trustworthiness
and deterrence"-are undercut by "the absence of any [actual] coercion or improper
tactics."'13 Put otherwise, when officers merely violate Miranda's prophylactic safe-
guards, neither of the aims of Miranda exclusion can justify the exclusion of evidence
other than the accused's statements. Although this was dictum, the Court was effec-
tively declaring that all evidentiary products of a statement obtained without Miranda
warnings-witness testimony, tangible evidence, or subsequent "voluntary" statements
by the suspect himself-are outside the reach of Miranda's exclusionary doctrine.
Despite a causal connection to the Miranda transgression, "derivative" evidence is not
presumptively inadmissible.'14
failure to warn the suspect "of his right to appointed counsel" was in complete good faith be-
cause it "occurred prior to the decision in Miranda." Id. Consequently, the Court did not be-
lieve that excluding the witness's testimony would "significantly augment[]" any deterrent
effect "on future police conduct" produced by suppressing the suspect's statements. Id. at 448.
The Tucker majority specifically refused to rule on the question of whether "evidence
derived from statements taken in violation of the Miranda rules must be excluded regardless
of when the interrogation took place," preferring to rest on the "narrower ground" that evidence
derived from pre-Miranda violations need not be excluded. Id. at 447. It is significant that
the Elstad majority did not acknowledge the narrowness of Tucker's holding and reasoning.
Instead, Justice O'Connor depicted Tucker as a broad ruling that neither objective of Miranda
suppression is ever served by excluding derivative evidence, be it a witness's testimony or
any other "article of evidence." Elstad, 470 U.S. at 308.
12 Elstad, 470 U.S. at 308.
"3 Id. The use of the phrase "improper tactics" as an alternative to "coercion" on more
than one occasion is one of the sources of Elstad's opaqueness. See supra note 92. The Court
did not explain what it meant by "improper tactics" and thus left unclear the contours of the
category of cases that would not be governed by the Elstad rule of admissibility.
"14 Justice Brennan highlighted and was alarmed by the Court's deliberately broad pro-
nouncements about the "fruits" of Miranda violations, but observed that these declarations
were not a part of the holding. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 319 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Court's
apparent elimination of any derivative evidence principle under Miranda was dictum because
the only evidence at issue was a "voluntary" statement made after subsequent compliance with
Miranda. Physical or other evidence that was acquired without any intervening exercise of free
will by the suspect or anyone else was arguably distinguishable from the successive confession
involved in Elstad because the exercise of free will can attenuate a connection between an
impropriety and derivative evidence. See United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268,277 (1978)
(asserting that free will exercised by witness discovered by means of unreasonable search is
important factor in determining whether it is sufficiently attenuated from illegality to justify
admission); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590,602 (1975) (concluding that confession secured
by means of illegal arrest is admissible under attenuation exception only if the decision to
confess was "'sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint' (quoting Wong Sun
v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,486 (1963))). In fact, much of the remaining reasoning of the
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The Court distinguished "errors.. . in administering the prophylactic Miranda
procedures" from "police infringement of the Fifth Amendment itself"" 5-that is, from
cases in which there is proof that officers have actually compelled a suspect to speak."6
Mere Miranda "errors," according to Justice O'Connor, "should not breed the same
irremediable consequences" as genuine, proven compulsion." 7 A conclusion that the
"simple failure to administer the warnings," absent proof of "any actual coercion" or
other undermining of a suspect's "free will," precludes "a subsequent voluntary and
informed waiver.., for some indeterminate period," would have been "an unwar-
ranted extension of Miranda."' " Instead, "the admissibility of any subsequent state-
ment should turn ... solely on whether it is knowingly and voluntarily made.""' 9 In
other words, in cases involving successive confessions following initial failures to
warn, the analysis should focus exclusively on whether compliance with Miranda
preceded the second confession. The initial Miranda violation has no bearing on the
second confession's admissibility.
The majority could have ended its opinion at this point, reversing the suppression
of the post-warning confession on the broad, general ground that neither the interest
in avoiding compelled self-incrimination and in preventing the potentially erroneous
convictions that result from extorted statements nor the interest in ensuring that officers
abide by the Miranda scheme justify the exclusion of voluntary confessions that follow
initial unwarned confessions. The Court opted to continue, however, focusing more
Elstad majority had relied heavily upon the exercise of free will by the suspect preceding his
second confession, a factor that is often not present when officers follow the leads provided
by a suspect's admissions to other inculpatory evidence.
115 Elstad, 470 U.S. at 309.
116 It is noteworthy that the Court subsequently held that actual compulsion of a suspect
to speak is not a violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege itself because that guarantee is
a courtroom protection against conviction based on compelled statements. See Chavez v.
Martinez, 538 U.S. 760,767 (2003) (plurality opinion); id. at 777-79 (Souter, J., concurring
in the judgment).
117 Elstad, 470 U.S. at 309. This is the first of a number of misleading suggestions (or,
perhaps, "strawmen") in Justice O'Connor's opinion. No one had contended that the conse-
quences of a failure to warn should be "irremediable." The argument was that a failure to warn
should be presumed to have continuing effects beyond subsequent Miranda warnings, and the
state should have the burden of demonstrating that a later statement was not the product of
those effects. Even in situations where actual coercion produces an initial confession, it is
possible to "remedy" the wrong and secure an admissible statement by taking steps to eradi-
cate the impact of the coercion. See id. at 310 ("When a prior statement is actually coerced, the
time that passes between confessions, the change in place of interrogations, and the change
in identity of the interrogators all bear on whether the coercion has carried over to the second
confession."); see also Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600,628 (2004) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
("Elstad commands that if [a] first statement is shown to have been involuntary, the court
must examine whether the taint dissipated through the passing of time or a change in circum-
stances."). No one suggested otherwise.
18 Elstad, 470 U.S. at 309.
119 Id. (emphasis added).
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specifically on the topic of successive confessions and on the logical missteps that
led Oregon to suppress Elstad's second admission.
The state court had declared the second statement inadmissible because of the
"'coercive impact' of the inadmissible statement," which could only be "dissipate[d]"
by a "lapse of time and change of place." 120 Justice O'Connor again observed that
a mere failure to warn "does not mean" that an initial statement has "actually been
coerced" but instead merely gives rise to a presumption that "the privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination has not been intelligently exercised.' 2 Consequently,
there is no basis to assume that coercion has caried over to a subsequent confession
and to require the government to prove otherwise. The condition that renders the
first statements inadmissible-the absence of warnings-is cured by "a careful and
thorough administration of Miranda warnings" prior to a second statement. 22 The
warnings equip the suspect to make an adequately informed and free choice, elimi-
nating any basis for presuming compulsion and excluding a post-warning admission.
The Oregon court's reliance on the "subtle form of lingering compulsion" gen-
erated by a "suspect's conviction that he has let the cat out of the bag and, in so doing,
has sealed his own fate," was also misguided. "2 According to the Elstad majority, "the
psychological impact of voluntary disclosure of a guilty secret [does not] qualif[y]
as state compulsion or compromise[] the voluntariness of a subsequent informed
waiver."' 24 To exclude a post-warning statement on this ground would be to "disable
the police from obtaining... informed cooperation" and "immunize[] a suspect...
from the consequences of his... informed waiver" even though the statement at issue
was not, in fact, the product of any "official coercion."' 125 In sum, "[w]hen neither the
initial nor the subsequent admission is coerced," there is no Fifth Amendment justifi-
cation for "permitting [a] highly probative ... voluntary confession to be irretrievably
120 Id. at 310.
121 Id. I have always found this turn of phrase to be odd and misguided. The question surely
is not whether an individual has made an informed or wise choice to exercise his right not
to be compelled to be a witness against himself. When a suspect chooses to speak, he is not
electing to forego that right-i.e., he has not decided to allow officials to break his will. It
seems far preferable to describe the effect of a failure to warn as a "presumption that a suspect
has been compelled to speak." The Elstad majority, however, cannot be faulted as the source
of this misdescription. Chief Justice Warren used the same language in Miranda itself. See
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,468 (1966) (holding that a warning of the "right to remain
silent" is a "threshold requirement for an intelligent decision as to [the] exercise" of the privi-
lege); id. at 469 (stating that only by warning suspect of "consequences of forgoing" the privi-
lege can there "be any assurance of real understanding and intelligent exercise of the privilege").
122 Elstad, 470 U.S. at 310-11.
123 ld. at311.
24 Id. at 312 (emphasis added). Miranda's prophylactic safeguards require that the suspect's
disclosure of the guilty secret be presumed to be compelled; but that disclosure is actually
voluntary because there has been no specific proof that it was, in fact, forced from the suspect's
mind against his will. Id. at 307.
125 Id. at311-12.
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lost to the factfinder." 126 The "high cost to legitimate law enforcement activity" im-
posed by suppression is not counterbalanced by any protection that would be gained
for "the individual's interest in not being compelled to testify against himself."'
27
The majority perceived a genuine "causal distinction between" initial confessions
that are the product of actual coercion and those that result from a mere failure to
wam. 28 There is reason to fear "the direct consequences flowing from [actual] co-
ercion of a confession by physical violence or other deliberate means calculated to
break the suspect's will" 29 because the official pressures that overcame the suspect's
will are likely to have continuing influence. On the other hand, the "consequences of
disclosure of a 'guilty secret' freely given in response to an unwarned but noncoercive
question" are "uncertain. '"13 When the official misconduct is a mere failure to warn,
the consequences are uncertain because it is unknown whether there is "any psycho-
logical disadvantage created by [the unwamed] admission" and unclear whether any
disadvantage affected the "ultimate decision to cooperate" by making a second state-
ment. '' In such circumstances, "[i]t is difficult to tell with certainty what motivates
a suspect to speak."'132 Thus, the mere making of "an unwarned admission does not
warrant a presumption of compulsion." 33 The "administration of Miranda warnings"
prior to a second statement "should suffice to remove the conditions that precluded
admission of the earlier statement."'
134
The majority concluded its opinion by turning its attention briefly to the specific
facts of Elstad. It determined that there had been no actual coercion initially and that
the waiver prior to the suspect's second inculpatory statement was knowing and vol-
untary. "' Therefore, under the principles the Court had endorsed, the defendant's
126 Id. at 312.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Id.
'31 Id. at 313. The Court noted that in the particular circumstances of Elstad, "the causal
connection between any psychological disadvantage created by his admission and his ultimate
decision to cooperate [was] speculative and attenuated at best." Id. at 313-14.
132 Id. at 314.
133 Id.
134 Id. One might view this as a sort of 'presumptive attenuation" resulting from compliance
with Miranda. Under the Fourth Amendment, the government has the burden of showing a
sufficient weakening of the causal link; Miranda warnings alone do not suffice. See Brown v.
Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603 (1975) (rejecting a per se rule that compliance with Miranda's
dictates attenuates the connection between an illegal arrest and a confession). For Miranda
violations, that burden is effectively carried by satisfying Miranda's requirements before the
successive confession is made. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 314.
'3- Elstad, 470 U.S. at 314-16. Elstad had argued that the waiver was not "informed...
because he was unaware that his prior statement could not be used against him." Id. at 316.
The majority replied that a waiver is valid even though a suspect might not be aware of the
inadmissibility of his first statement. Id. First, it would not be "practicable" to tell a suspect
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police station confession was admissible. In a concluding section, the majority did
return to generalities in what appears to have been an effort to downplay the Miranda-
corrosive nature of its ruling. According to the majority, it had "in no way retreat[ed]
from the bright-line rule of Miranda," had not "impl[ied] that good faith excuses a fail-
ure" to warn, and was not "condon[ing] inherently coercive police tactics or methods
offensive to due process .... ,136 Moreover, the majority was not "establishing a rigid
rule," but instead was holding that "there is no warrant for presuming coercive effect"
where an initial statement, though "technically" obtained "in violation of Miranda,
was voluntary. The relevant inquiry is whether, in fact, the second statement was also
voluntarily made."'137 This approach was appropriate because "the dictates of Miranda
and the goals of the Fifth Amendment proscription against use of compelled testimony"
can be "satisfied" without suppressing successive confessions and because "[n]o fur-
ther purpose is served" by barring admissions that follow "a voluntary and knowing
waiver.' ' 38 In sum, the Court had merely held "that a suspect who has once responded
to unwarned yet uncoercive questioning is not thereby disabled from waiving his
rights and confessing after he has been given the requisite Miranda warnings. ' ' 139
2. Potential Retreats from the Logic of Elstad: The Court's Opinions in Withrow
and Dickerson
For almost twenty years, the Court provided little insight into the scope or mean-
ing of Elstad. During that time there were two opinions that did suggest that the Court
might be backing away from some of Elstad's more expansive reasoning. This section
examines those opinions and their potential implications.
In Withrow v. Williams,"4 the Court surprised analysts by construing Miranda's
exclusionary rule more broadly than the Fourth Amendment rule.14' The Elstad ma-
jority had indicated that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule had a deservedly
that his statement is inadmissible. Id. More important, "complete appreciation of all of the
consequences flowing from the nature and the quality of the evidence in the case" is not neces-
sary to establish a valid, sufficiently knowing waiver. Id. at 317.
136 Id. at 317.
137 Id. at 318 (footnote omitted).
138 Id.
13' Id. In dissent, Justice Stevens observed that he found "nothing objectionable" in this
formulation of the majority's holding. Id. at 364 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In fact, this summary
of the Elstad rule was misleading. Neither the defendant nor the Oregon court had suggested
that a failure to warn should permanently disable a suspect who has confessed from subse-
quently waiving his rights. A more accurate description of the holding would have been con-
siderably broader. In truth, the Court held that a failure to warn alone provides no basis for
excluding a subsequent confession made after officers have complied with Miranda's dictates.
Moreover, in dictum, it powerfully indicated that there was no basis for excluding any deriva-
tive evidence under Miranda. See supra text accompanying notes 112-14.
'40 507 U.S. 680 (1993).
141 Id. at 691.
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broader sweep than Miranda exclusion-a "fruits" doctrine that suppressed derivative
evidence, for example-because its targets were actual violations of genuine constitu-
tional rights, not mere failures to abide by overbroad prophylactic safeguards.14 2 In
Withrow, a five Justice majority held that a Miranda claim is cognizable on habeas
corpus review even without a showing that the state courts denied a full and fair hear-
ing of the claim.143 This more generous treatment of Miranda exclusion was clearly
rooted in the differences in the objectives of Fourth Amendment and Miranda sup-
pression. The suppression of evidence secured in violation of the Fourth Amendment
prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures is a mere deterrent device aimed
at future illegalities but powerless to remedy any present wrong. The exclusion of
evidence under Miranda, however, "safeguards 'a fundamental trial right"'-the
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination-and does so at the time the sup-
pression occurs.'" By keeping potentially compelled statements from the courtroom,
the Miranda rule prevents Fifth Amendment violations at trial and preserves the critical
interests and values that underlie that guarantee.'45 This justifiable but nonetheless
remarkable account of the vital functions Miranda exclusion plays in shielding a fun-
damental constitutional freedom stood in dramatic contrast to Elstad' s emphasis on the
costly constitutional overbreadth of Miranda suppression and the distinct, repeated in-
timations that the prophylactic objectives of Miranda exclusion are less worthy and
more easily outweighed than the aims of Fourth Amendment exclusion. Although the
holdings of Withrow and Elstad were reconcilable,'" the two opinions' attitudes to-
ward Miranda-based suppression seemed worlds apart. 14 7
142 Elstad, 470 U.S. at 306.
141 Withrow, 507 U.S. at 683-84. In Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), the Court held
that the balance of interests underlying the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule tipped
against allowing habeas review of those claims unless a state had denied a full and fair hearing.
Id. at 489-94.
'44 Withrow, 507 U.S. at 691 (emphasis omitted) (quoting United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264 (1990)).
14' These values include the preference for an accusatorial justice system, opposition to
inhumane treatment, dedication to principles of fair play that insist on balance between the
state and individuals and require the government to carry its burden of proof without relying
on thoughts forced from the mind of the accused, respect for human dignity, and the entitle-
ment to preserve the privacy of thoughts. See Withrow, 507 U.S. at 692 (quoting Murphy v.
Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52,55 (1964)). Moreover, Miranda exclusion
also promotes the core Fifth Amendment interest in avoiding the untrustworthy convictions
that some compelled statements would yield. See id.
146 Withrow dealt with the substantive use of statements obtained in violation of Miranda
in the government's case-in-chief-that is, the immediate products of improprieties. Elstad, on
the other hand, was concerned with successive confessions and other "derivative" evidence.
117 As will be seen, the vision of Miranda exclusion on which Withrow rests has proven
to be anomalous, not a harbinger of dramatic change in the Court's attitude toward Miranda
suppression. In more recent years, the Court has clearly endorsed Elstad's crabbed, restrictive
conception of Miranda-based exclusion. See United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 639-40
(2004); id. at 645 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). Barring some dramatic shift on
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The other opinion that cast some doubt upon the vitality of Elstad's premises is
Dickerson v. United States,'4 8 the landmark decision that rejected an effort to over-
throw Miranda. The arguments in support of the attempted coup-i.e., the reasons
favoring the view that Miranda could be replaced by congressional legislation effec-
tively enacting the due process voluntariness standard that Miranda had declared in-
sufficient--derived much of their force from Elstad and the other precedents that had
declared the Miranda prescriptions and its exclusionary rule to be prophylactic rules,
not constitutional rights. According to the logic of these arguments, because Miranda's
constraints on custodial interrogation and on the use of confessions were mere guide-
lines and procedural protections, failures to comply with the Miranda scheme did not
violate the Fifth Amendment or deprive anyone of a constitutional entitlement.' 49 Con-
sequently, Congress and the states must have the authority to supplant any and all of
Miranda's dictates with rules of their own choice. Nothing in the Fifth Amendment
privilege stood in their way.
the Court, Elstad's logic will undoubtedly continue to serve as the foundation for further
erosion of the Miranda doctrine. The replacement of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
O'Connor with Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito surely will change nothing.
One explanation for Withrow is that it was decided when Justice Kennedy-who was
not a member of the Court at the time of Elstad-was relatively new to the Court and not yet
inclined to join in the dismantling of Miranda protections. If that same question were to arise
today, he might agree with the position of the dissenters, in which case the five-to-four decision
not to extend the Stone v. Powell doctrine to Miranda violations would almost certainly come
out the opposite way. On the other hand, Justice Kennedy remains unwilling to accept every
invitation to whittle away at Miranda. See id. (refusing to join plurality opinion's narrowing
assertions about Miranda); Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 618-21 (2004) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (agreeing that there are some successive confession cases follow-
ing failures to warn in which Elstad does not govern); Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146
(1990) (authoring majority opinion that refuses to allow officers to initiate communications
with suspect who requests counsel following consultation with counsel). For that reason, it is
stillpossible to garner a bare majority (Justices Stevens, Souter, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Breyer)
to resist some extreme inroads upon Miranda's safeguards. Five Justices might still consider
the extension of Stone v. Powell to statements obtained in violation of Miranda to be too
destructive of the protection Miranda affords against the "risk of overlooking an involuntary
custodial confession .... a risk that" is "unacceptably great when the confession is offered
in the case in chief to prove guilt." Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 442 (2000).
14' 530 U.S. 428.
149 See, e.g., Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298,307 (1985) (characterizing Miranda as "pro-
tective medicine," which "provides a remedy even to the defendant who has suffered no iden-
tifiable constitutional harm"); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984) (interpreting
Miranda warnings as 'not themselves rights protected by the Constitution"' (quoting Michigan
v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433,444 (1974))); Tucker, 417 U.S. at 443 ("[T]he court in Miranda estab-
lished a set of specific protective guidelines, now commonly known as the Miranda rules.");
id. at 444 (noting that "[t]he suggested [Miranda] safeguards were not intended to 'create[]
a constitutional straitjacket"' (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966))).
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The Dickerson Court rejected the argument that Elstad and other cases explaining
the nature of Miranda's scheme had rendered it susceptible to replacement by any alter-
native a federal or state legislature saw fit to enact.150 Moreover, the Court refused to
use the logical footings of Elstad as a foundation for overruling Miranda.151 Instead,
the Court affirmed Miranda's constitutional stature, announcing that even though its
prescriptions are not constitutional rights, they are "constitutionally required.' ' 52 In
addition, the Court avoided the deprecatory labels affixed to Miranda by Elstad and
other opinions, not once referring to the safeguards as mere "prophylactic rules" or
"procedural guidelines."''
The majority's refusal to follow what some believed to be the logical implications
of Elstad's core premises to their ultimate conclusion-the demise of Miranda-led
some to conclude that at least the reasoning of Elstad, if not its holding, had been seri-
ously undermined. 54 Dickerson was seen as not only Miranda's savior, 55 but as a
S0 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 440-44. The Court observed that any alternative had to be "'at
least as effective' as the prescriptions of Miranda "'in apprising accused persons of their
right of silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise it."' Id. at 440 (quoting
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467); see also Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 441 (stating that a substitute must
"be equally as effective in preventing coerced confessions").
'5' Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 441.
152 id. at 438.
11 Justice Scalia noted that the majority had "not mentioned" that Miranda constituted
an "adopti[on of] prophylactic rules to buttress constitutional rights," and "applaud[ed] ... the
refusal... to enunciate [that] boundless doctrine of judicial empowerment." Id. at 457, 461
(Scalia, J., dissenting). He asserted, however, that there was "in fact no other principle that
[could] reconcile" the Court's "judgment with the post-Miranda cases that the Court refuses
to abandon," and that the majority's decision would therefore "stand for" the proposition that
the Court has "the power... to write a prophylactic, extraconstitutional Constitution." Id. at 461.
There is much force to Justice Scalia's interpretation of the majority opinion in Dickerson.
See Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 29 (2004)
(expressing surprise that not one Justice thought "Justice Scalia's condenmation of
prophylactic rules" in his Dickerson dissent "important enough to warrant rebuttal"); Yale
Kamisar, Foreword: From Miranda to § 3501 to Dickerson to. . ., 99 MICH. L. REv. 879,
893 (2001) (suggesting that no one responded to Scalia's dissent for fear that it would have
"splintered" the 7-2 majority).
154 See, e.g., United States v. Patane, 304 F.3d 1013, 1019 (10th Cir. 2002) (noting that
Dickerson's declaration that Miranda "articulated a constitutional rule... undermined the
logic underlying Tucker and Elstad"), rev'd, 542 U.S. 630 (2004); Kirsten LelaAmbach, Note,
Miranda's Poisoned Fruit Tree: The Admissibility of Physical Evidence Derived from an
Unwarned Statement, 78 WASH. L. REV. 757,773 (2003) ("[T]he Dickerson opinion greatly
undermined the principal reasoning underlying... Elstad .... "); Benjamin D. Cunningham,
Comment, A Deep Breath Before the Plunge: Undoing Miranda's Failure Before It's Too Late,
55 MERCERL. REV. 1375, 1411 (2004) (predicting that, when deciding Patane and Seibert, "the
Court will necessarily have to consider the continued viability of Elstad in light of Dickerson").
151 See George M. Dery Ill, The "Illegitimate Exercise ofRaw Judicial Power: " The Supreme
Court's Turf Battle in Dickerson v. United States, 40 BRANDEIs L.J. 47, 77 (2001) ("Dickerson
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potential repudiation of the foundational erosion precipitated by Elstad and other
precedents that had appeared to weaken Miranda's constitutional moorings."5 6
3. Elstad Revived and Explained: The Later Opinions in Seibert and Patane
Elstad proved much more resilient than its opponents and critics hoped. In 2004,
two significant opinions made it unmistakably clear that neither Withrow nor Dickerson
had robbed Elstad of any force. Although Elstad' s holding sustained a modest limi-
tation, its reasoning emerged unscathed.
The decision in Missouri v. Seibert'57 imposed the limitation. Therein, the Court
addressed a "question-first" technique in which officers deliberately omitted Miranda
warnings, secured confessions, then recited warnings and exploited the earlier, un-
warned session to secure successive confessions.' A bare, five-Justice majority con-
cluded that Elstad did not dictate admissibility in every situation involving initial
failures to warn, subsequent compliance with Miranda, and successive admissions.1
59
Instead, in some successive confession situations the warnings given after an initial in-
terrogation could not effectively serve the compulsion dispelling function contemplated
by the Miranda doctrine.' 6° According to the Court, when the circumstances are such
that it is not "reasonable to find that" midstream "warnings could function 'effectively"'
to convey the substance of the Miranda rights to a suspect, a successive confession is
inadmissible.' 61 In those situations, the two stages of interrogation cannot be viewed
saved Miranda from a brink of the Court's own making, but not because the [J]ustices demon-
strated any faith in the constitutional basis of the Miranda warnings.").
156 See Charles D. Weisselberg, In the Stationhouse AfterDickerson, 99 MICH. L. REv. 1121,
1121 (2001) (noting that after the "Supreme Court allowed Miranda's foundation to erode,"
the Court "placed Miranda upon a more secure, constitutional footing" in Dickerson). For
a thorough, thoughtful discussion of Dickerson, see Yale Kamisar, Dickerson v. United States:
The Case That Disappointed Miranda's Critics-and then Its Supporters, in THE REHNQUIST
LEGACY 106 (Craig M. Bradley ed., 2006).
117 542 U.S. 600 (2004).
158 Id. at 609-10. There was evidence that some law enforcement agencies had adopted this
approach as a matter of policy-i.e., that they were deliberately exploiting what they perceived
to be the Elstad endorsed option of questioning first without warnings, obtaining inadmissible
statements, then securing second statements after Miranda compliance. As they saw it, Elstad
entitled them to use the latter statements at trial. Id. at 610.
9 Id. at 614-15.
60o Id. at 616.
161 Id. at 611-12. Although the quotations are taken from the plurality's opinion, it is fair
to say there is majority support for the general proposition that in some settings intervening
warnings cannot accomplish their purpose. See id. at 618, 621 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment) (observing that the question-first "interrogation technique" is problematic because
it "undermines the Miranda warning and obscures its meaning" and that it "simply creates
too high a risk that postwarning statements will be obtained when a suspect [is] deprived"
of essential knowledge and is unable to understand his rights).
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as "distinct." 162 Both the initial statements and those that follow the warnings are
deemed inadmissible because officers have at no point complied with Miranda's most
basic prerequisite--effective warnings. 1
63
The four Justices in the plurality seemed inclined to restrict Elstad' s reach fairly
severely. Their opinion evinces a distinct hostility to the question-first tactic and ap-
pears to view the Elstad approach as applicable only in exceptional situations. Some
of the plurality's generalizations,64 its explanation of the reasons why the warnings
in Elstad could have been effective while those in Seibert could not, and its specifi-
cation of the variables that should determine whether warnings can be effective after
an initial, unwarned interrogation1 61 might well have led to a regime in which ad-
mission under Elstad was the exception and exclusion under Seibert was the rule. At
the very least, the plurality's doctrine would have empowered lower courts to find
warnings to be ineffective in a sizeable number of question-first cases.
The plurality's approach, however, is not the controlling law. Justice Kennedy
furnished the essential fifth vote for the result. While he professed "agree[ment] with
much in the careful and convincing opinion for the plurality,"1" he refused to join that
opinion. Instead, he concurred only in the judgment, endorsing a standard that clearly
162 Id. at 612-13 (plurality opinion).
163 Id. at 617.
"6 In his opinion for the plurality, Justice Souter observed that "it is likely that if... interro-
gators ... withhold[] warnings until after interrogation succeeds. . ., the warnings will be in-
effective in preparing the suspect for successive interrogation, close in time and similar in
content." Id. at 613 (emphasis added). Justice Souter added that when "warnings are inserted
in the midst of coordinated and continuing interrogation, they are likely to mislead and 'de-
priv[e] a [suspect] of knowledge essential to his ability to understand... his rights"' and that
"two spates of integrated and proximately conducted questioning" should not "ordinarily" be
treated "as independent... simply because Miranda warnings formally punctuate them in the
middle." Id. at 613-14 (emphasis added) (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412,424 (1986)).
165 In contrasting Elstad with Seibert, the plurality opinion identified and highlighted a
number of "relevant facts that bear on" the efficacy of "midstream" warnings. Id. at 615. The
factors specified included: the "completeness and detail" of the initial questions and answers,
the degree to which the content of the two statements overlapped, the closeness in timing and
the similarity in setting of each session, the continuity of the officers involved, and the extent
to which the questioning "treated the second round [of interrogation] as continuous with the
first." Id. In Elstad, virtually every factor supported the effectiveness of the warnings, while
in Seibert, a case at "the opposite extreme," every variable weighed against efficacy. Id. at 616.
Moreover, Elstad involved "a good-faith Miranda mistake," while Seibert involved a delib-
erate "police strategy adapted to undermine the Miranda warnings." Id. at 615-16. Because
the facts of Elstad and those of Seibert placed the cases at opposite ends of the spectrum, the
Court did not address situations in which some of the relevant variables pointed in one
direction and some pointed in the other. It seems unlikely, however, that many cases would
involve facts as innocuous as those in Elstad. To the contrary, under the plurality's approach,
many successive confession cases would probably involve enough Seibert-like variables to
militate against a holding that warnings were able to serve their purpose.
" Id. at 618 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
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envisions Elstad as the general rule and Seibert the relatively rare exception. 167
According to Justice Kennedy, warnings ought to be deemed ineffective only if of-
ficers have employed a "deliberate, two-step strategy"-that is, only if there is an
"intentional" choice not to warn as part of a scheme "to obscure both the practical
and legal significance of the [Miranda] admonition.' 68 If a violation is shown to have
been intentional, then post-warning statements are inadmissible only if they are
"related to the substance of prewarning statements."' 69 Moreover, even related state-
ments are admissible if officers have employed "[c]urative measures... designed to
ensure that a reasonable person in the suspect's situation would understand the import
and effect of the Miranda warning and of the Miranda waiver., 170 In sum, the only
instances in which Justice Kennedy would deem the warnings ineffective are those in
which deliberate, uncured failures to warn yield successive statements related to the
initial statements. If any one of these three criteria is not satisfied-that is, if the
violation is not intentional, if curative steps are taken, or if the content of the succes-
sive confession is sufficiently unrelated to the content of the initial confession-
warnings are presumptively effective and Elstad's rule of admissibility governs.' 7 '
Justice Kennedy's opinion reflects the governing rule of law because the cases en-
compassed by his criteria are the only cases in which there is a majority for the propo-
sition that warnings were ineffective and statements must be excluded. 172 Looked at
from the other direction, four dissenting Justices asserted that Elstad governs all suc-
cessive confession cases. 73 In their view, post-warning successive confessions are
167 There is no need to infer this view. Justice Kennedy explicitly declared Elstad to be the
norm. See id. at 620.
168 Id. at 620-21.
169 Id. at 621.
170 Id. at 622. Curative measures could include a "substantial break in time and circumstances"
or an "additional warning that explains the likely inadmissibility" of the initial statement. Id.
'' Justice Kennedy's approach requires an assessment of subjective intent. Moreover, it har-
bors at least two ambiguities. First, he did not specify precisely the steps that ought to be deemed
sufficiently curative, observing that "a substantial break in time and circumstances... may suf-
fice in most circumstances" and that "an additional warning that explains the likely inadmis-
sibility of the prewarning ... statement may be sufficient." Id. (emphasis added). In addition,
it is uncertain how "related" two statements must be to meet the third element of his standard.
172 In Justice Kennedy's view, a "deliberate" violation of Miranda is essential to render
warnings ineffective. Id. Although the plurality acknowledged that an officer's intent "is
likely to determine the conduct of the interrogation," it refused to focus on "the intent of the
officer" because such intent "will rarely be as candidly admitted as it was" in the Seibert
case. Id. at 616 n.6 (plurality opinion). The plurality instead prescribed an "objective" approach
in which "the focus is on facts apart from intent that show the question-first tactic at work."
Id. Despite this significant difference, it seems almost certain that the four plurality Justices
would find warnings inefficacious in every case where Justice Kennedy's approach would dic-
tate that conclusion. In other words, it is difficult, if not impossible, to imagine a case in which
Justice Kennedy would find the warnings ineffective, but the plurality would deem them ade-
quate to perform their expected functions.
' Id. at 622-23 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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inadmissible only in cases where a first statement is actually coerced and the co-
ercion has carried over'74 or in the undoubtedly rare situations where a second state-
ment is shown to be "involuntary despite the Miranda warnings."'175 Consequently,
five Justices consider Elstad controlling in all cases except the quite limited number
of instances carved out by Justice Kennedy's Seibert concurrence.
176
Seibert, therefore, imposes a relatively modest restriction on the scope of Elstad's
rule of admissibility for post-warning confessions following initial failures to warn.
Moreover, eight Justices endorsed a significant foundational premise of Elstad-that
the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine is not relevant "for analyzing the admissibility
of a subsequent warned confession following 'an initial failure... to administer the
warnings required by Miranda. "177 There was widespread agreement in Seibert that
the only pertinent inquiry is whether the circumstances undermine the efficacy of the
warnings. If second stage warnings function effectively, Elstad's conclusion that an
initial failure to warn furnishes no predicate for excluding a post-warnings confession
is controlling.
Finally, Seibert shed light on another very significant aspect of Elstad's reasoning.
In her dissent, Justice O'Connor (Elstad's author) observed that the Elstad majority
had rejected the "theory" that successive confessions were subject to exclusion be-
cause of the "'coercive impact"' of the suspect's awareness that he had "let the 'cat out
"' The government would apparently have the burden of showing that initial coercion did
not carry over to a subsequent confession. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 344 (1985)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that derivative evidence principle requires that when the
authorities act illegally they bear the burden of proving the taint has not carried over to sub-
sequently acquired evidence).
"' Seibert, 542 U.S. at 628 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting, for example, that an officer's
reference to a pre-warning statement to put pressure on a suspect to speak might compromise
the voluntariness of the second statement despite Miranda warnings).
176 See United States v. Gonzalez-Lauzan, 437 F.3d 1128, 1135-36 (11 th Cir. 2006) (apply-
ing the standards from Justice Kennedy's Seibert concurrence), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 146
(2006); United States v. Mashburn, 406 F.3d 303, 309 (4th Cir. 2005) (declaring Kennedy's
opinion to be "the holding of the Seibert Court"); Yale Kanisar, Postscript: Another Look at
Patane and Seibert, the 2004 Miranda "Poisoned Fruit" Cases, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 97, 112
(2004) (observing that Kennedy held "the decisive vote"); Gary T. Kelder, CriminalProcedure,
55 SYRACUSE L. REv. 889, 911 (2005) (noting that Kennedy's concurring opinion is the
"controlling" law); Joelle Anne Moreno, Faith-Based Miranda?: Why the New Missouri v.
Seibert Police "Bad Faith" Test Is a Terrible Idea, 47 ARIz. L. REV. 395, 396 (2005) (recog-
nizing Kennedy's concurrence as the governing test).
177 Seibert, 542 U.S. at 612 n.4 (plurality opinion) (quoting Elstad, 470 U.S. at 300). The
only Justice about which there is doubt on this score is Justice Breyer. He joined the plurality
opinion, but he also authored a concurrence that endorsed a fruits analysis. Id. at 617-18
(Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy indicated no disagreement with the plurality's
disavowal of a "fruits" analysis in successive confession situations. And the dissenting Justices
explicitly agreed with the plurality's reaffirmation of Elstad's rejection of the "fruits"
approach in successive confession settings. Id. at 623 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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of the bag."'178 She further explained that the reason for this "outright" rejection was
not a refusal "to recognize the 'psychological impact of the suspect's conviction that
he has let the cat out of the bag,"' but instead a refusal "to 'endo[w]' those 'psycho-
logical effects' with 'constitutional implications."' "79 That refusal was based on a bal-
ancing of the interest in preventing compelled self-incrimination against the interest
in promoting legitimate "law enforcement interests."'' 80 In other words, the Elstad ma-
jority had not rejected the fact of a psychological connection between an unwarned
confession and a suspect's decision to make a post-warning statement. Rather, it had
concluded that despite this connection, there was little, if any, risk that the post-warning
statement was compelled and, consequently, insufficient justification for the injury to
effective crime control inflicted by its exclusion.
18
'
United States v. Patane182 provides even more evidence that a majority of the
Court remains convinced of the merits of Elstad's characterization of Miranda's under-
pinnings. Patane not only reiterated and relied upon core premises of Elstad, it con-
verted that opinion's most significant dictum into law and laid the groundwork for
possible further erosion of the justifications for Miranda suppression.8 3
Patane was a truly simple case. Without reciting Miranda warnings, an officer
asked an arrestee about the location of a firearm he was suspected of possessing.'"
The man replied that the gun was in his bedroom, whereupon the officer entered the
man's home, found the weapon where he had indicated it would be, and seized it.
8 5
178 Id. at 627.
'7 Id. (alteration in original).
180 Id. at 628.
181 In Elstad, Justice Brennan accused the majority of ignoring widely recognized psycho-
logical realities about the interrogation process. See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 324 (Brennan, J., dis-
senting). In Seibert, Justice O'Connor responded to this accusation, asserting that the Elstad
majority had not meant to deny the existence of the cat out of the bag phenomenon-i.e., had
not intended to deny that it operated psychologically to affect a suspect's willingness to confess
a second time. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 627 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Instead, the majority had
decided that this connection between an unwarned and a warned confession should have no
significance as a matter of constitutional law. This explanation is somewhat reminiscent of
Justice O'Connor's explanation in J.E.B. v. Alabama that the Court was not denying the in-
fluence gender has upon a person's attitudes and perspectives as a matter offact, but instead
was declaring, as a matter of constitutional law, that assumed gender influence was not a legiti-
mate ground for exercising peremptory juror challenges. See 511 U.S. 127, 149-51 (1994)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
Although Justice O'Connor's Seibert dissent represented the views of only four Justices,
it seems virtually certain-in light of his concurring opinion in United States v. Patane-that
Justice Kennedy would subscribe to these views. See United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630,
644-45 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring). It is even possible, perhaps even likely, that one
or more members of the Seibert plurality would concur with this characterization of Elstad.
182 542 U.S. 630.
183 See infra text accompanying notes 193-209.
8 Patane, 542 U.S. at 635.
185 Id.
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The sole issue was whether Miranda's exclusionary rule extended to such evidentiary
"fruits. ' 186 Put otherwise, the question was whether Miranda exclusion encompasses
derivative evidence-evidence acquired as a result of statements secured in violation
of Miranda.
8 7
The majority's answer was also simple: the Miranda exclusionary rule extends
only to the statements initially made as a result of a violation and bars no derivative
evidence.'88 Although the logical trail that led to this conclusion was quite complex,
a majority of the Court did reaffirm the vitality of Elstad and its reasoning.'89
The Patane Court confirmed the core Elstad premise that statements obtained in
violation of Miranda are presumed to be compelled but are, in fact, voluntary.'9 The
conclusion that derivative evidence is beyond Miranda' s ambit rested squarely, and
primarily, on that foundation. Justice Thomas conceded that the Fifth Amendment
bars from trial evidence derived from actual compulsion.'9' He found no consti-
tutional bar to evidence acquired from Miranda violations, however, because "the Self-
Incrimination Clause... is not implicated by the introduction at trial of physical
evidence resulting from voluntary statements," and statements resulting from mere
Miranda transgressions are "not actually compelled."'
' 92
Patane reaffirmed another basic underpinning of Elstad-that the Wong Sun de-
rivative evidence principle (or "fruits" doctrine), which was developed in response
to actual Fourth Amendment violations, is entirely inapplicable to Miranda violations
because failures to follow Miranda's rules are not Fifth Amendment violations.' 93
Powerful dictum in Elstad had indicated that the Miranda exclusionary rule did not
186 Id. at 633-34.
87 By not treating this issue as settled by Elstad, the Court, in essence, acknowledged that
the potent indications that Miranda lacked a "fruits" doctrine were, in fact, dicta, and that the
question had remained unsettled for the nearly forty years that Miranda had been on the books.
188 Patane, 542 U.S. at 634.
189 Only three members of the Court-Justices Thomas, Rehnquist, and Scalia-joined the
plurality opinion. Id. at 633. The other two Justices who subscribed to the holding-Justices
Kennedy and O'Connor--concurred only in the result. Id. at 644 (Kennedy, J., concurring in
the judgment). They highlighted elements of the plurality's reasoning that they could not en-
dorse but expressed agreement with the plurality's understanding of Miranda's constitutional
foundations. Id. at 644-45.
'90 Id. at 636, 639, 644 (plurality opinion). Elstad, of course, was not the only precedent
to have relied upon this explanation of Miranda. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654,
655 n.5 (1984).
91 Patane, 542 U.S. at 640 (plurality opinion) ("[T]he Self-Incrimination Clause is self-
executing," and, therefore, "'those subjected to coercive police interrogations have an automatic
protection from the use of their involuntary statements (or evidence derived from [those] state-
ments) in any subsequent criminal trial."' (quoting Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 769
(2003) (plurality opinion))); id. at 644 ("[I]t is true that the Court requires the exclusion of
the physical fruit of actually coerced statements.").
192 Id. at 634, 639 (emphasis added).
'9' Id. at 641-42.
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prohibit the introduction of derivative evidence."9 Elstad' s sole holding, however,
was that a second, post-warning confession was not subject to exclusion merely be-
cause of an initial failure to warn.'95 In arriving at that conclusion, the Elstad Court
relied somewhat heavily upon the fact that compliance with Miranda established vol-
untariness and "cured" the condition that dictates exclusion of the initial, unwarned
statement. 96 Patane confirmed that the Wong Sun doctrine is wholly irrelevant under
Miranda.97 Five Justices agreed that derivative physical evidence is not subject to
suppression even though there is no intervening compliance with Miranda and, thus,
no voluntary choice to weaken the causal connection between the Miranda violation,
the inadmissible confession, and the evidence that it has yielded. By so doing, the
Court turned broad dictum into controlling law and dramatically narrowed the ambit
of Miranda exclusion.
Elstad and other cases eroded Miranda's force in part by characterizing its scheme
as "prophylactic."'' 98 The Dickerson Court's avoidance of that pejorative in describing
the Miranda doctrine and its emphasis upon Miranda's "constitutional" character had
generated some doubt about the validity of Elstad's understanding of Miranda.199
By describing Miranda as a "prophylactic rule[]" that "necessarily sweep[s] beyond
the actual protections of the Self-Incrimination Clause," 2°° Patane proved that the
Court had abandoned neither Elstad' s terminology nor the conception of Miranda
reflected by that terminology. According to Justice Thomas, the Elstad Court's view
that Miranda's protection is constitutionally overbroad had not been undermined by
Dickerson's announcement that Miranda is "a constitutional rule.' 20' Instead, by re-
lying on precedents like Elstad, the Dickerson Court had actually "demonstrate[d]
the[ir] continuing validity. ' 202
194 See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 308 (1985) (suggesting that whether the "alleged
'fruit' of a noncoercive Miranda violation is... a witness.... an article of evidence, [or] ...
the accused's own voluntary testimony," the "twin rationales" for exclusion under Miranda are
not implicated).
95Id. at 318.
196 Id. at 310-11.
1 Patane, 542 U.S. at 637.
198 See, e.g., Elstad, 470 U.S. at 305 (quoting New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654
(1984)).
199 See supra text accompanying notes 148-56.
200 Patane, 542 U.S. at 639 (plurality opinion).
201 See id. at 640.
202 Id. Implicit in the plurality's opinion and explicit in Justice Kennedy's concurrence were
endorsements of the notion that Miranda doctrine is rooted in interest-balancing-i.e., that it
rests upon a weighing of the interest in protecting against violations of the Fifth Amendment
against the interest in effective law enforcement. See id. at 644-45 (Kennedy, J., concurring
in the judgment). Although that balancing theme was not explicitly developed in Elstad, there
can be little doubt that the Elstad majority's opinion reflected an interest-balancing analysis.
See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 312 (observing that the "immunity" that would result from a bar to
successive, warned confessions would "come[] at a high cost to legitimate law enforcement
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In the conclusion of his Patane opinion, Justice Thomas announced two new
premises designed to further diminish Miranda and its exclusionary rule. First, he
opined that mere failures to warn not only do not violate the Fifth Amendment rights
of suspects, they do not "even" violate "the Miranda rule."20 3 In his view, violation
of the Miranda rule can only occur in the courtroom, for Miranda's core concern is
the admission of evidence." 4 In addition, going beyond where Elstad had ventured,
Justice Thomas asserted that "there is, with respect to mere failures to warn, nothing
to deter., 205 The Elstad majority assumed that Miranda-based exclusion rested on two
rationales, deterrence and trustworthiness, 2 6 but had indicated that deterrence was a
less important objective than it was under the Fourth Amendment because the impro-
prieties sought to be discouraged do not violate a constitutional right.07 The Patane
plurality sought to completely eliminate deterrence as a justification for Miranda
exclusion.20 8 Neither of these new premises, however, could gain majority support.
Justices Kennedy and O'Connor refused to join the plurality opinion because they
believed it was "unnecessary to decide whether" a failure to warn "should be charac-
terized as a violation of the Miranda rule," or whether, with respect to Miranda vio-
lations, "there is '[any]thing to deter.'"209
4. The Admissibility of Successive Confessions Under Miranda: An
Explanatory Summary
Seibert and Patane dispel any doubts about Elstad's health generated by the de-
liberately opaque opinion in Dickerson. Together, Seibert and Patane confirm and
illuminate Elstad's holding. More important, they endorse and expand its under-
lying reasoning. After Seibert and Patane, a number of generalizations about Miranda
seem fair.
activity, while adding little desirable protection to the individual's interest in not being com-
pelled to testify against himself"). The fullest explanation of the interest-balancing process
that underlies Miranda itself and that should inform the resolution of Miranda doctrine issues
is Quarles, 467 U.S. at 654-57. Not all Justices believe that this is an accurate description of
Chief Justice Warren's reasoning in Miranda. See id. at 681 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (asserting
that the "majority's error stems from a serious misunderstanding of Miranda" which "consisted
of... more than ajudicial balancing act" and accusing the majority of "misread[ing] Miranda").
'0' Patane, 542 U.S. at 641 (plurality opinion).
204 Id.
205 Id. at 642 (emphasis added).
206 This notion did not originate in Elstad but was a premise of Michigan v. Tucker, 417
U.S. 433, 449 (1974).
207 See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 306-07.
208 See Patane, 542 U.S. at 639-40 (plurality opinion).
209 Id. at 645 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). These were the only specific aspects
of the plurality's reasoning that the concurring Justices expressly disavowed. Moreover, they
did not declare that the plurality was wrong in these respects. Instead, they merely asserted
that it was not necessary to resolve those questions at this time. Id.
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First, statements obtained in violation of Miranda are inadmissible because of the
unacceptably great risk that they are compelled and that their introduction could there-
fore violate the Fifth Amendment privilege. 210 The primary focus and concern of the
doctrine is on the trial process, not the out of court conduct of the authorities.2 1' The
use of compelled statements to convict is forbidden by the Fifth Amendment in part be-
cause they may be untrustworthy and lead to the conviction of innocent persons, but
also because conviction based on compelled admissions conflicts with fundamental
values of our accusatorial system.2 2 Miranda's exclusionary rule bars statements from
trial in order to enforce the explicit command of the privilege against self-incrimination.
Miranda exclusion may also be justified by deterrence-i.e., a desire to remove in-
centives for law enforcement to ignore or neglect Miranda's restrictions on custodial
interrogation and thereby to ensure compliance with its out-of-court dictates. It seems
evident, however, that deterrence is, at best, a secondary rationale.
Successive statements following compliance with Miranda are not subject to
exclusion because neither rationale for that doctrine's exclusionary rule can support
suppression. There is no cognizable risk that successive confessions are themselves
compelled. Both initial and successive statements are the products of custodial inter-
rogation. At the second session, however, effective Miranda warnings and a valid
waiver "cure" the condition that render the initial statement inadmissible by dispelling
the compulsion inherent in custodial interrogation and eliminating the basis for pre-
suming involuntariness."' Moreover, unlike the situation involving actual compulsion
210 See id. at 639 (plurality opinion); Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434-35
(2000).
211 See Patane, 542 U.S. at 641; Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760,766 (2003); Withrow
v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 692 (1993).
212 See Withrow, 507 U.S. at 688,692; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,469-70 (1966).
In my view, the Court's assertion in both Tucker and Elstad that "trustworthiness" and
"deterrence" are the twin justifications for exclusion under Miranda is misleadingly narrow.
The Fifth Amendment protection against compulsory self-incrimination surely does provide
shelter against inaccurate convictions resulting from untrustworthy admissions given to escape
official pressures. The Fifth Amendment, however, also serves other fundamental values by
prohibiting convictions based upon compelled confessions, values that are jeopardized even
when confessions or other evidence are trustworthy. See supra note 145 and accompanying
text. The constitutional bar to reliable physical evidence causally connected to actually com-
pelled statements is a clear illustration of this constitutional premise in operation. See Patane,
542 U.S. at 644.
Consequently, I characterize the first (and primary) justification for the Miranda exclu-
sionary rule as the prevention of conviction based on compelled statements not merely the
prevention of untrustworthiness. I believe this reformulation of the rationales for exclusion
under Miranda is theoretically important. However, it is not critical to proper analysis and
resolution of the questions addressed in this Article. If I were to accept the Tucker and Elstad
Courts' myopic portrayal of Miranda's rationales, the reasoning and conclusion concerning
Massiah's exclusionary rule would be no different.
213 Of course, if the circumstances demonstrate that the warnings were ineffective, as in
Seibert, then the second confession is excluded because it harbors the same risks as the first.
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at the initial session, there is insufficient reason to believe that official compulsion has
carried over-through the warnings and waiver-to the second interrogation. This is
not to say that successive confession cases are identical to cases in which there is no
initial statement resulting from a Miranda violation. In fact, a suspect might well be
induced to confess again by the realization that he has already divulged incriminating
information to the authorities.2" 4 This "inducement" to speak, however, does not sup-
port a conclusion that a successive statement has been compelled within the meaning
of the Fifth Amendment. Internal psychological pressure generated by an inculpatory
admission that was not actually compelled does not constitute official compulsion.2"5
Although they are not compelled testimony themselves, the evidentiary fruits of
actual compulsion are forbidden because their use violates Fifth Amendment values.216
It is arguable that a successive confession following a Miranda violation must be ex-
cluded to serve Miranda's goal of preventing compulsory self-incrimination because
the successive confession is, in fact, the evidentiary fruit of compulsion. The Elstad
majority suggested two possible reasons why this argument lacks merit. First, there
were intimations that the Court doubted whether the cat out of the bag phenomenon
was real as a matter of fact and that it meant to reject the premise that an initial ad-
mission prompts a suspect to confess a second time.2"7 If that were the case, successive
See, e.g., Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 617 (2004).
214 As noted earlier, the Court has acknowledged the reality of this process and the factual
connection between the first and second confessions. In the words of the majority in Brown
v. Illinois, the suspect's realization that he has already confessed his guilt once "bolster[s] the
pressures for him to" do so a second time, "or at least vitiate[s] any incentive on his part to
avoid self-incrimination." 422 U.S. 590, 605 n.12 (1975).
215 If the first statement is actually compelled, the second statement is presumed to be the
product of that compulsion and the burden is put on the government to demonstrate that it
is not. See supra note 117 and accompanying text. The apparent reason for a presumption of
continuing compulsion, despite Miranda compliance, is the likelihood that a suspect will con-
tinue to be effected and motivated by pressures that were initially brought to bear upon him.
See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 310 (1985) (suggesting that the concern is with "co-
ercion ... carr[ying] over into the second confession"). It is unclear whether the psycho-
logical disability and the resulting pressures to speak are considered to be official compulsion
when they result from actual compulsion. See id. at 312 ("[T]he psychological impact of
voluntary disclosure of a guilty secret [does not] qualif[y] as state compulsion." (emphasis
added)). In any case, when the cat has been driven out of the bag by actual compulsion, any
statement made as a result would seem to be derivative of the actual compulsion and, thus,
forbidden by the Fifth Amendment's bar to all extorted evidence.
216 See Patane, 542 U.S. at 639 (citing New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450,458-59 (1979)).
Thus, Justice O'Connor's suggestion in New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 666-71 (1984)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting), that non-testimonial fruits are not barred by the Fifth Amendment
because that guarantee is concerned only with compelled testimonial evidence, was misguided.
217 Elstad, 470 U.S. at 312-14. The Court described the connection in Elstad's case as
"speculative and attenuated at best." Id. at 313-14 (emphasis added). The majority also noted,
more generally, that it "is difficult to tell with certainty what motivates a suspect to speak."
Id. at 314. One can hear at least a suggestion that the Court might have been unwilling, in
general, to presume the existence of a "psychological disability" or any influence on a
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confessions would not constitute the "fruits" of compulsion because there would be
no causal link between the presumptively compelled statements and the later ad-
missions. Subsequently, however, it has become clear that the Court did not mean
to deny the existence of the "psychological disability" and motivation generated by
an initial confession.21 As a matter of fact, a causal connection does exist.
The other reason, one which has withstood the test of time, is that statements ob-
tained in violation of Miranda are presumptively, but not actually, compelled.219 The
Fifth Amendment's concern with the fruits of compulsion is not implicated and its
values are not threatened by the use of evidence derived from a Miranda violation-in
this case, a successive confession-because that evidence is the product of a voluntary
statement. If physical evidence with an undeniably strong connection to unwarned
statements is admissible at trial because the Fifth Amendment "cannot be violated by
the introduction of... evidence obtained as a result of voluntary statements" 22 -and
Patane clearly so holds-then a successive confession, whose causal connection is
arguably weakened by intervening compliance with Miranda, must be admissible for
the very same reason.22" '
In sum, Miranda's goal of guarding against conviction based on compulsory self-
incrimination does not support the exclusion of a successive confession because com-
pliance with Miranda dispels the compulsion arising from custodial interrogation,
because there is no initial actual compulsion that could be influencing the suspect
to confess again, because the pressure to speak generated by the awareness one has
already confessed is not state compulsion, and because the successive confession is
the "fruit" of a voluntary statement.
Patane raises doubts about whether deterrence truly is a justification for Miranda
exclusion. Even if it remains a legitimate objective of Miranda exclusion, however,
deterrence does not justify the exclusion of a successive confession. Because a fail-
ure to follow Miranda's dictates for custodial interrogation is not a violation of a
suspect's decision to confess a second time. Justice Brennan apparently interpreted the major-
ity's opinion that way, arguing that it had swept "aside [the] common-sense approach" of prior
cases "as 'speculative,"' had held that compliance with Miranda "serves to break any causal
connection" between statements, and had employed "marble-palace psychoanalysis," possibly
on the basis of its "grasp[ of] some psychological truth that ha[d] eluded" others. Id. at 324
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
218 See supra text accompanying notes 178-81.
219 See supra text accompanying notes 101-04.
220 Patane, 542 U.S. at 637.
221 Surely it is arguable that the same risks of compelled self-incrimination thatjustify the
presumption that unwarned statements are compelled and that lead to their exclusion from the
government's case-in-chief are present in evidence derived from those statements and should
lead to the exclusion of derivative evidence. The Court's disagreement with this position re-
flects a conclusion that the additional costs to law enforcement from suppressing derivative
evidence tips the balance against any further expansion of Miranda's already constitutionally
overbroad prophylactic barrier.
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constitutional right but merely the transgression of a prophylactic rule,222 the interest
in discouraging Miranda violations (or in encouraging compliance with the Miranda
scheme) is less weighty than the interest in safeguarding constitutional rights. That
interest is sufficient to counterbalance the harm to law enforcement inflicted by sup-
pressing statements obtained in violation of Miranda.
The scales, however, tip the other way when derivative evidence is placed in the
balance. Sufficient deterrence is achieved by the prospect of losing the initial state-
ments for the government's case-in-chief. Additional, incremental deterrence that
might be gained by excluding any derivative evidence-including a successive con-
fession-is outweighed by the interests in effective law enforcement promoted by
admitting the evidentiary products of voluntary statements."' Put simply, when en-
forcement of an overbroad prophylactic scheme is the aim, the cost-benefit analysis
that underlies the deterrent rationale for excluding evidence justifies only the sup-
pression of the primary products-statements obtained in violation of Miranda. It
does not justify additional losses of probative evidence.
These are the logical premises that have led the Court to adopt and adhere to the
Elstad rule-a general rule of admissibility for successive confessions that follow
mere Miranda violations. Whether these or other premises support the extension of
that rule to right to counsel deprivations-as the Eighth Circuit held on remand in
Fellers-hinges on the justifications for exclusion under the Sixth Amendment.224
The next section addresses that subject.
C. The Underpinnings of the Sixth Amendment Exclusionary Rule 225
The question here is whether the Sixth Amendment exclusionary rule is a deterrent
safeguard designed to discourage future out-of-court deprivations of counsel, an integral
part of the constitutional right to assistance, a constitutionally rooted prophylactic that
guards against courtroom deprivations of the right to counsel, or some combination
of the above. A definitive answer cannot be found in Supreme Court opinions. The
Court has rarely discussed the nature of Sixth Amendment suppression and has pro-
vided astoundingly little insight into the bases for excluding evidence obtained in vio-
lation of the Massiah doctrine. After reading the scant tea leaves provided by the
222 Patane, 542 U.S. at 641.
223 Moreover, the Miranda violation provides no basis for questioning the trustworthiness
of any derivative evidence. Neither physical evidence nor successive statements can be ren-
dered unreliable or misleading by a preceding Miranda violation.
224 United States v. Fellers, 397 F.3d 1090, 1095 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct.
415 (2005).
225 A number of years ago, I wrote at length about this topic. See James J. Tomkovicz, The
Massiah Right to Exclusion: Constitutional Premises and Doctrinal Implications, 67 N.C.
L. REV. 751 (1989) [hereinafter Tomkovicz, Massiah Right to Exclusion]. Fellers has furnished
an occasion to revisit and reconsider the subject.
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precedents, I offer what I find to be the most, indeed the only, defensible explanation
for Sixth Amendment exclusion.
1. The Supreme Court's Sketchy, Equivocal Intimations
The Massiah majority did not discuss the justifications for Sixth Amendment
exclusion. Nonetheless, its landmark opinion provides powerful indicia of the reason
for suppressing statements deliberately elicited from an uncounseled accused.226 The
Court's express holding was that Massiah "was denied the basic protections of [the
Sixth Amendment] when there was used against him at his trial evidence of his own
incriminating words, which federal agents had deliberately elicited from him after he
had been indicted and in the absence of his counsel. 227 Moreover, responding to the
argument that the government "had the right, if not indeed the duty" to continue to
investigate Massiah's criminal activities, the majority indicated that "it was entirely
proper to continue an investigation" despite the indictment.228 According to the Court,
the Sixth Amendment commanded but one consequence: the accused's "own in-
criminating statements... could not constitutionally be used by the prosecution as
evidence against him at his trial. 229
The import of these declarations is unmistakable. The Massiah majority believed
that the right to counsel was violated not by deliberate elicitation but by the entry of
the accused's admissions into the courtroom. 230 The Sixth Amendment violation was
not completed, and no constitutional harm occurred during the government's extra-
judicial confrontation of the defendant.23' Instead, both the wrong and the harm were
realized when the accused's incriminating statements were used at trial to secure a
conviction.232 At Massiah's birth, exclusion was understood to be an integral part
of the constitutional right to a lawyer's assistance.233 A constitutional transgression
occurred when, and only when, the government used disclosures to the accused's dis-
advantage.3 Moreover, the Court's endorsement of deliberate elicitation of infor-
mation from an accused for investigatory purposes makes it evident that the Massiah
226 Massiah is a landmark because it was the Court's first attempt to deal with the frus-
trations and inefficacy of the sole prior constraint on official efforts to secure confessions-the
Due Process Clause's coerced confession doctrine. Massiah predated the Court's much more
notable and noticed effort in Miranda by two years. Moreover, Massiah remains a landmark
because it provides the only meaningful constitutional protection against government efforts
to employ undercover agents to secure evidence of guilt and because the Court has diminished
Miranda's protection in numerous opinions issued over the past thirty-five years.
227 Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964) (emphasis added).
228 Id. at 206-07.
229 Id. at 207 (emphasis added in part).
230 Id. at 206-07.
231 Id. at 207.
232 id.
233 Id. at 204 (citing Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 327 (1959)).
234 See id. at 206-07.
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Court did not think of exclusion as a deterrent measure.235 The object was not to dis-
courage uncounseled elicitation, which, by itself, was constitutionally unobjectionable.
Later opinions have not been as direct or definitive about the underpinnings of
Sixth Amendment exclusion. There have been some additional indications that the
right to counsel is violated in court when evidence is introduced. 236 On the other hand,
the Court has muddied the waters with suggestions that a constitutional violation occurs
when agents engage in pretrial elicitation.237 Still, the Court has never denied that the
enjoyment of the right to counsel defined by Massiah requires that the government
be prohibited from using improperly obtained statements against an accused at trial-
i.e., that exclusion is an indivisible part of the entitlement to assistance.
The Court has addressed Sixth Amendment exclusion directly in two cases. In Nix
v. Williams,238 the question was whether evidence derived from statements secured in
violation of Massiah was admissible if it "ultimately or inevitably would have been
discovered by lawful means." 239 The Court held that such evidence is admissible
under the "inevitable discovery doctrine, 240 reasoning first that the doctrine was fully
consistent with the deterrent objectives of exclusion because it puts the government
in no "better position than it would have been in if no illegality had transpired.,
241
235 See id. at 207.
236 See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 161 (1985) (characterizing the issue as whether
the Sixth Amendment right of the accused was violated by admission of statements elicited
in counsel's absence); id. at 179 (reaffirming the Massiah Court's declaration that it was legiti-
mate to continue to investigate but not to use the fruits of that investigation against the accused
at trial); see also Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 422-23 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
(indicating that the majority apparently perceived the function of Sixth Amendment exclu-
sion as different from the function of Fourth Amendment exclusion).
237 See, e.g., Moulton, 474 U.S. at 176 (observing that the Sixth Amendment is violated
"when the State obtains incriminating statements by knowingly circumventing the accused's
right to have counsel present in a confrontation between the accused and a state agent"); id.
at 177 n.13 (recognizing a "constitutional right not to reveal"); id. at 178 n.14 (stating that the
"Sixth Amendment protects the right of the accused not to be confronted by an agent of the
State" and that the right to counsel "was violated as soon as the State's agent engaged [the
accused] in conversation"); United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 274 (1980) (holding that the
intentional creation of a situation likely to induce incriminating statements violated the defen-
dant's right to counsel). As will be seen, I believe these statements are the result of careless
phraseology. It is noteworthy that the Fellers Court studiously avoided assertions that a consti-
tutional violation occurred when officers elicited information from the accused. See Fellers v.
United States, 540 U.S. 519, 525 (2004). Instead, the Court consistently described the officers'
actions as a "violation of Sixth Amendment standards." Id. (emphasis added). It is entirely pos-
sible that the Court's phrasing was not accidental but was a deliberate effort to avoid the sug-
gestion that rights are violated at the moment of elicitation. The Fellers Court may have been
attempting to reaffirm Massiah's original conception of the Sixth Amendment entitlement.
238 467 U.S. 431 (1984).
239 Id. at 444.
240 Id. at 440-43.
241 Id. at 443-44.
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Excluding evidence that would inevitably have been obtained lawfully would instead
put the government in a "worse position simply because of some earlier police error
or misconduct," a result thought inconsistent with "derivative evidence analysis. 242
Moreover, to satisfy the inevitable discovery doctrine the government need not prove
an "absence of bad faith.24 3 When evidence that would have been discovered law-
fully is at issue, "the societal costs of the exclusionary rule far outweigh any possible
benefits to deterrence that a good-faith requirement might produce." 2' Thus, while
the Nix Court did not expressly assert that deterrence is a legitimate rationale for Sixth
Amendment exclusion and certainly did not endeavor to explain why that might be
a constitutionally defensible conclusion, its opinion was premised on an assumption
that Massiah exclusion seeks to discourage out-of-court conduct.
The Nix majority, however, did entertain the possibility that there is an additional
justification for Sixth Amendment suppression. The defendant argued that "the Court
may not balance competing values" because "the Sixth Amendment exclusionary rule
is designed to protect the right to a fair trial and the integrity of the factfinding pro-
cess."245 The contention, in essence, was that exclusion was an inseparable part of
the entitlement to assistance.2' Intriguingly, the Court neither rejected nor explicitly
endorsed this understanding of Massiah suppression. Instead, the Court explained why
the introduction of evidence that would inevitably have been lawfully discovered was
fully compatible with the rationale posited by the defendant.247 First, reliable physical
evidence can hardly jeopardize the "integrity or fairness of a criminal trial."248 In ad-
dition, the admission of evidence that would have appeared at trial without any im-
propriety cannot undermine "the adversary system of justice" because "[f]airness [is]
assured by placing the State and the accused in the same positions they would have
been in had the impermissible conduct not taken place."'249
In sum, Nix did not explicitly endorse any rationale for Sixth Amendment ex-
clusion. The Court assumed that deterrence was an objective, but did not explain the
logic of that assumption or reconcile it with the Massiah Court's approval of elicita-
tion without use. 5 ° The Court also entertained, but did not approve of, the notion that
exclusion might be a constitutional entitlement of the accused-i.e., part and parcel of
242 Id.
243 Id. at 445.
244 Id. at 446.
245 Id.
246 Id. at 446-47.
247 See id.
248 Id. at 446. This part of the Court's response was focused purely on the question of
substantive fairness-i.e., whether there was any risk of inaccuracy that could unfairly lead
a fact-finder to convict an innocent person.
249 Id. at 447. This part of the Court's response targeted procedural fairness-i.e., whether
the accused might be convicted due to an advantage the government had secured by confronting
an unaided, unequal adversary.
210 Id. at 444-46.
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the entitlement to a fair trial, the core objective of the Sixth Amendment.25' As a result,
Nix offers no definitive insights into the premises underlying Massiah exclusion.
The Court had another occasion to address Sixth Amendment exclusion in
Michigan v. Harvey,252 a case in which officers had violated the rule of Michigan v.
Jackson. 3 According to Jackson, once an accused requests a lawyer, no waiver of
the right to counsel is valid unless the suspect initiates further communications with
the police.254 Because officers in Harvey had initiated communications after the defen-
dant's request for assistance, his waiver was invalid and the statements elicited from
him without counsel could not be used to prove guilt.255 The question, however, was
whether the accused's trial testimony could be impeached with statements secured
in violation of the Jackson rule. 6
Logical resolution of this issue seemed to require identification of the justifications
for exclusion under Massiah. In prior cases, the Court had made it clear that if ex-
clusion is a constitutional right, even limited use for impeachment is impermissible.257
On the other hand, if exclusion is not a right but a deterrent safeguard258 or part of a
prophylactic scheme designed to prevent constitutional violations,259 impeachment use
may be permissible. A five Justice majority, however, managed to find a way to re-
solve the narrow issue in Harvey without identifying the general rationales for Sixth
Amendment exclusion.
The Harvey Court held that impeachment use of the defendant's statements was
constitutionally acceptable 260 but pointedly confined its holding and the supporting
reasoning to violations of the special safeguard against invalid waivers provided by
251 Id. at 446.
252 494 U.S. 344 (1990).
253 475 U.S. 625 (1986).
254 Id. at 636. This rule originated in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), to govern
invocations of the Fifth Amendment-based entitlement to counsel afforded by Miranda. The
Jackson Court decided that the Edwards rule was equally applicable when the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel was at issue. Jackson, 475 U.S. at 636. That decision remains controversial.
See Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 174-77 (2001) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (questioning the
legitimacy of the Jackson doctrine).
255 Harvey, 494 U.S. at 345-48.
256 Id. at 345-46.
257 Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 397-98 (1978) (concluding that the use at trial of a
coerced confession not only for substantive purposes, but for any purpose, including impeach-
ment, violates due process).
258 See United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620,626-28 (1980) (holding that impeachment
of an accused's testimony with evidence secured in violation of his Fourth Amendment right
is consistent with the deterrent goals of suppression).
259 See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225-26 (1971) (holding that impeachment of
the accused's testimony with statements obtained in violation of Miranda is consistent with
that doctrine's aims).
260 Harvey, 494 U.S. at 348.
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Michigan v. Jackson.26' According to the majority, the Jackson branch of the Massiah
doctrine is a constitutionally overbroad prophylactic rule cut from the same mold as
Miranda's entire Fifth Amendment scheme.262 When officers initiate communications
and secure waivers and statements contrary to the mandate of Jackson, they do not
necessarily deprive an accused of his Sixth Amendment entitlement to assistance.263
Instead, they generate risks of invalid waivers." To guard against these risks-and,
thus, to prevent the deprivations of counsel that could result-the Jackson doctrine
deems any waiver resulting from an official initiation invalid.2 65 An accused has not
necessarily been denied his constitutional entitlement in a Jackson setting because his
waiver of assistance is presumed, but not proven, to be invalid.266 As a result, a state-
ment produced by a Jackson violation is not necessarily the result of a denial of assis-
tance,267 and there can be no constitutional right to have such a statement suppressed.
Harvey teaches us that statements secured in violation of Jackson are excluded
to guard against the risks of Sixth Amendment violation, not because their admission
would violate the right to counsel.268 Because risk prevention is the justification for
Jackson and its exclusionary rule, it is permissible to balance interests to decide
whether suppression is justified in a particular situation.269 In the majority's view,
the law enforcement costs of barring impeachment use exceed any preventive gains
produced by exclusion.27°
Harvey obviously provides limited insights into Sixth Amendment exclusion.
By restricting the analysis to Jackson violations and characterizing Jackson as a pro-
phylactic rule-not an essential component of the constitutional entitlement to assis-
tance-the majority managed once again to avoid explaining why statements secured
261 Id. at 349-54.
262 See id. at 350 (asserting that the Jackson decision "simply superimposed the Fifth Amend-
ment analysis of Edwards [v. Arizona]," a "prophylactic rule" that protects against involuntary
waivers following requests for counsel under Miranda "onto the Sixth Amendment").
263 See id. at 349, 352-53.
264 See id. at 350-51.
265 Id. at 349 (stating that after a request for counsel, "any waiver of Sixth Amendment
rights... is presumed invalid ... to help guarantee that waivers are truly voluntary").
266 id.
267 See id. (observing that Jackson's "presumption... renders invalid some waivers that
would be considered voluntary, knowing, and intelligent under the traditional case-by-case
inquiry").
268 Id. The Court hinted that, like exclusion under Miranda, exclusion under Jackson may
also promote deterrent purposes-i.e., it may also serve to induce officers to refrain from
initiating communications and eliciting information after clear assertions of the right to counsel.
See id. at 351-52 (stating that under Miranda, the Court concluded that the interest in
promoting the search for truth can outweigh the speculative possibility that the "exclusion of
evidence might deter future violations of rules not compelled directly by the Constitution in
the first place").
269 Id. at 351.
270 See id. at 351-52.
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in violation of Massiah's core standards are inadmissible.27' For other types of Massiah
violations, the premises for exclusion were left unspecified.
2. A Sensible Constitutional Explanation
Since I first reflected upon Sixth Amendment exclusion over fifteen years ago,
some of my views have evolved.272 My most fundamental conclusion, however, is un-
changed. I continue to believe that the original conception of Sixth Amendment ex-
clusion that informed the Massiah decision is constitutionally sound. The bar to the
use of deliberately elicited statements is an essential component of the constitutional
right, not merely a deterrent sanction and not a prophylactic safeguard.273 A sketch of
the logic supporting that conclusion follows.
As is clear from the earlier discussion, there are a number of possible justifications
for constitutionally-based exclusionary "rules." The Fourth Amendment exclusionary
rule-the most prominent and frequently invoked rule-is rooted in deterrence.274 It
is neither a personal right of nor a compensatory remedy for one who has been the
victim of an unreasonable search or seizure.275 Rather, it is a creature of the judiciary,
designed to eliminate incentives for future violations of the Fourth Amendment.276
271 The Harvey majority made it absolutely clear that it was not addressing the exclusionary
consequences of Massiah violations that threaten a "'core value' of the Sixth Amendment's
constitutional guarantee." Id. at 353. Such a violation would involve an actual deprivation of
the entitlement to assistance, not the mere violation of a prophylactic safeguard. In conclusion,
the majority observed: "[W]e need not consider the admissibility for impeachment purposes
of a voluntary statement obtained in the absence of a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right
to counsel." Id. at 354. This left open the distinct possibility that exclusion for other sorts of
Massiah violations-surreptitious undercover agent elicitation and known officer elicitation
in the absence of a valid waiver-is a Sixth Amendment right, and that impeachment use,
like substantive use, violates that right.
272 See generally Tomkovicz, Massiah Right to Exclusion, supra note 225.
273 The dissenters in Harvey espoused this understanding of Sixth Amendment exclusion.
See Harvey, 494 U.S. at 361-65, 367-69 (Stevens, J., dissenting). It has also found support
from other commentators. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Confessions and the Court, 79 MICH.
L. REV. 865, 889-90 (1981); Silas J. Wasserstrom & William J. Mertens, The Exclusionary
Rule on the Scaffold: But Was It a Fair Trial?, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 85, 175 (1984).
274 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 916 (1984).
275 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
276 See Leon, 468 U.S. at 919 (observing that the purpose of exclusion is to "instill in
those particular investigating officers, or in their future counterparts, a greater degree of care
toward the rights of an accused" (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433,447 (1974)));
Calandra, 414 U.S. at 347 ("[T]he rule's prime purpose is to deter future unlawful police
conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment. . . ."). The Court
has acknowledged that preserving "U]udicial integrity" is an ancillary goal of the Fourth
Amendment rule but has explained that notion in a way that makes it coextensive with
deterrence. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 921 n.22. The admission of illegally obtained evidence,
according to the Court, only threatens judicial integrity when it disserves the deterrent aims
of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. Id.
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Similarly, Miranda's exclusionary doctrine is not a personal entitlement of an indi-
vidual subjected to custodial interrogation; the admission of statements obtained in
violation of Miranda's dictates does not violate a defendant's Fifth Amendment privi-
lege.277 Instead, Miranda's exclusionary rule is a constitutionally required "prophylac-
tic" device that furnishes "enlarged," overbroad shelter against the risks of compelled
self-incrimination generated by and inherent in custodial interrogation.278 Its primary
function, unlike the Fourth Amendment rule, is to prevent Fifth Amendment violations
in the courtroom. 279 It may also serve to deter failures to abide by Miranda's constraints
on custodial interrogation.28 0 In contrast, the exclusion of coerced statements mandated
A majority of the Justices believe that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is a "judi-
cially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its
deterrent effect." Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348. Despite the fact that the judiciary has created this
remedy, its imposition on the states suggests that, like the Miranda scheme, it is constitutionally
required and can only be supplanted, if at all, by an equally effective alternative remedy.
By describing the views of a majority of the Court with regard to the rationales for Fourth
Amendment exclusion, I do not mean to endorse them. Justice Brennan, dissenting in Leon,
made a credible case for resurrecting the original conception of Fourth Amendment exclusion
as an integral part of the constitutional guarantee of "security" against unreasonable searches
and seizures. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 938-39 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
277 See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306-07 (1985) (stating that while the Fifth Amend-
ment bars only compelled statements, Miranda creates a "presumption of compulsion" that
leads to exclusion of voluntary statements and thereby provides a remedy to defendants suffer-
ing "no identifiable constitutional harm"); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649,655 n.5 (1984)
(noting that to allow introduction of statements obtained in violation of Miranda is not to
sanction the use of compelled statements in violation of the Fifth Amendment); id. at 658 n.7
(recognizing that "absent actual coercion... there is no constitutional imperative requiring
the exclusion of" statements). The decision to create a "'public safety' exception" to Miranda,
see id. at 655-56, and the decision to allow the prosecution to use statements for impeachment
purposes, see Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222,226 (1971), demonstrate that there is no Fifth
Amendment right to exclusion of statements obtained in violation of Miranda.
278 See United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 639 (2004) (plurality opinion) (Miranda is
a prophylactic rule that protects against the risk of compulsory self-incrimination but "nec-
essarily sweep[s] beyond the actual protections of the Self-Incrimination Clause"); see also
Elstad, 470 U.S. at 306-07 (Miranda's "exclusionary rule. .. sweeps more broadly than the
Fifth Amendment itself [and] may be triggered ... in the absence of a Fifth Amendment vio-
lation," providing a remedy to an accused "who has suffered no identifiable constitutional
harm"); cf. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 655-57 (Miranda warnings are "procedural safeguards" that
furnish "enlarged protection for the Fifth Amendment privilege").
279 Patane, 542 U.S. at 637 (plurality opinion) (stating that the Miranda rule "focuses on the
criminal trial"); id. at 641 (asserting that Miranda protects the Fifth Amendment privilege,
a "trial right," and that violations occur only upon admission of statements at trial); Withrow v.
Williams, 507 U.S. 680,691 (1993) (concluding that Miranda's exclusionary rule "safeguards
'a fundamental trial right."' (quoting United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259,264
(1990))); see also Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 790 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) ("Miranda mandates a rule of exclusion" and, therefore, "iden-
tification of a Miranda violation and its consequences.., ought to be determined at trial").
280 See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 308 (acknowledging deterrence as one of the "twin rationales"
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by the Due Process Clause and the bar to genuinely compelled admissions required
by the Self-Incrimination Clause are constitutional entitlements of the accused.281
Those two constitutional guarantees are violated by the use of such confessions at
trial. Suppression is not the consequence of an exclusionary rule, but, instead, is an
inextricable part of those constitutional entitlements. The deterrence of coercion or
compulsion may also be an objective of suppression. 82 That future-oriented aim, how-
ever, is secondary at best, subsidiary to the immediate, primary goal of avoiding con-
stitutional violations in the courtroom.
Any effort to identify the rationales for Sixth Amendment exclusion must be
rooted in the nature and purposes of the Massiah right to counsel. The guarantee of
legal assistance at trial---the Sixth Amendment's sole original objective 283 -is designed
to equalize an accused and protect against the increased risks of conviction that result
when a defendant must deal with the legal system or an expert adversary without a
lawyer's guidance.2  Massiah extended this very same trial guarantee into the pretrial,
of the Miranda exclusionary rule); Tucker, 417 U.S. at 446-47 (recognizing deterrence as
a goal of Miranda exclusion).
281 See Patane, 542 U.S. at 640 (plurality opinion) (noting that the Fifth Amendment "Self-
Incrimination Clause contains its own exclusionary rule" and "is self-executing"); Chavez,
538 U.S. at 769 (plurality opinion) (asserting that the Fifth Amendment affords defendants "an
automatic protection from the use of their involuntary statements... in any subsequent crim-
inal trial"); id. at 777 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) (declaring that the Fifth Amend-
ment "focuses on courtroom use of... compelled, self-incriminating testimony, and the core
of the guarantee... is the exclusion of any such evidence" (emphasis added)); Withrow, 507
U.S. at 691 (stating that the Fifth Amendment privilege is a "'trial right'); Verdugo-
Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 264 (opining that the Fifth Amendment privilege "is a fundamental
trial right of criminal defendants" violation of which "occurs only at trial"); Mincey v. Arizona,
437 U.S. 385, 398 (1978) (maintaining that "any criminal trial use against a defendant of his
involuntary statement is a denial of due process of law").
282 See Tomkovicz, Massiah Right to Exclusion, supra note 225, at 761-62 n.69 (deterrence
may be an objective of the due process based exclusion of coerced confessions). The case sup-
porting a deterrent rationale is stronger under the Due Process Clause than under the Self-
Incrimination Clause. In Chavez v. Martinez, a majority of the Justices concluded that officers'
mistreatment of a suspect cannot violate the Fifth Amendment privilege, which is solely a
courtroom guarantee, but that sufficiently egregious coercion by officers can itself deprive
a person of due process. Chavez, 538 U.S. at 766-67 (plurality opinion) (expressing, for four
Justices, the conclusion that Fifth Amendment protection is confined to the courtroom); id.
at 777 (Souter, J., concurring) (providing a majority for the view that the Fifth Amendment
privilege is not violated by out-of-court compulsion); id. at 779-80 (Souter, J., concurring)
(expressing the view of five Justices that a due process violation can be effected by officers'
pretrial mistreatment of an individual). Thus, while the suppression of a coerced confession can
deter out-of-court violations of the entitlement to due process of law, suppression cannot deter
out-of-court violations of the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination.
283 See United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 309 (1973) (asserting that the "core purpose
of the counsel guarantee was to assure '[a]ssistance' at trial").
284 See James J. Tomkovicz, An Adversary System Defense ofthe Rightto CounselAgainst
Informants: Truth, Fair Play, and the Massiah Doctrine, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1,26 (1988);
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post-accusation period to prevent the government from circumventing and undermin-
ing Sixth Amendment protection by conducting adversarial confrontations before the
formal trial starts.285 The ultimate objectives of that pretrial extension must be the same
as the objectives of assistance at trial. An accused is entitled to an equalizing assistant
when the government seeks to elicit information to shield him from the eventual trial
harms that are traceable to an unequal pretrial battle-i.e., the increased risks of con-
viction that can result from allowing the state to take advantage of an unaided accused.
The Massiah entitlement to counsel guards against diminution of the opportunity for
a favorable verdict caused by incriminating disclosures elicited from the defendant.
In the pretrial setting defined by Massiah's doctrine, legal assistance helps prevent
an accused from providing the adversary with ammunition that can seal his fate.
When counsel is denied and disclosures are used to convict, a defendant is surely
deprived of the most significant benefit of assistance. His opportunity to defend effec-
tively against an accusation is damaged because the state has exploited his inequality.
There are two ways to avoid depriving an accused of the core interests furthered by
Massiah. The first, of course, is to honor the entitlement to assistance in the first place
by either ensuring counsel's presence or securing a valid waiver of assistance. The
second is to bar the products of improper, uncounseled encounters from trial. In either
case, the accused will not be convicted on the basis of advantages the government has
secured by denying adversarial equalization.
This conception of the right to counsel makes it clear that Sixth Amendment
exclusion is quite unlike Fourth Amendment exclusion. In Massiah contexts, the con-
stitutional harm is not completed at the time officers engage in their out of court
elicitation. The primary, perhaps the exclusive, constitutional injury from the dep-
rivation of assistance occurs in court when the state introduces evidence. The focus,
therefore, cannot be solely on deterring future wrongs.
Massiah exclusion is also very unlike Miranda exclusion. The Court has never
suggested that any part of the Massiah doctrine other than the special rule of Michigan
v. Jackson286 is a constitutionally overbroad scheme designed to guard against unac-
ceptable risks of right to counsel violations.287 From the start, the Massiah entitle-
ment has been viewed as a necessary temporal extension of the actual right to trial
assistance. 288 And it is difficult to imagine how the Massiah doctrine might be recast
as mere prophylactic guidelines that guard against presumed, but not actual, right to
Tomkovicz, Pretrial Assistance, supra note 7, at 521-22.
285 Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205-06 (1964).
286 475 U.S. 625,636 (1986) (holding that once an accused asserts the right to assistance
"any waiver of the... right to counsel for... police-initiated interrogation is invalid").
287 See id. at 636-37 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (asserting that the Court has gone too far
by extending Edwards protections beyond coercive police action); see also id. at 637-38
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (explaining that the Edwards rule does not make sense in a Sixth
Amendment context).
288 See Massiah, 377 U.S. at 205-07.
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counsel violations. 89 Deliberate elicitation without counsel or a waiver does not sim-
ply generate a likelihood that the accused will be deprived of the equalizing assistance
counsel provides, it actually deprives the defendant of his entitlement to counsel's
protective input.
In fact, Massiah exclusion is akin to the suppression of statements under the Due
Process and Self-Incrimination Clauses. Like those two guarantees, the Sixth Amend-
ment safeguards an interest in not being convicted as a result of government methods
deemed unfair by our Constitution.29° All three provisions are violated-and trials are
unfair-when the evidentiary products of those methods are used to convict.29' When
the state's pretrial conduct is of a sort that would be forbidden at trial, all three guar-
antees are enforced by constitutional rights to exclusion, not judicially developed
exclusionary rules or remedies designed to prevent future wrongs or to guard against
risks of present wrongs. 292
289 Of course, before the Burger and Rehnquist Courts set to work reimagining the premises
underlying Miranda, it may have been difficult to conceive of that doctrine as an overbroad
prophylactic scheme. Still, the reconception of Miranda that governs today is logically defen-
sible. I cannot see how one can rationally explain the Massiah doctrine's core protections as
overprotective prophylaxis against constitutional risks.
290 The methods that are deemed unfair by each are different. The Fifth Amendment privi-
lege and the Due Process Clause seek to ensure fidelity to the accusatorial nature of our system
by targeting methods that force thoughts from the minds of suspects. See, e.g., Colorado v.
Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167, 170 (1986) (concluding that "coercive police activity" is required
to implicate the Due Process Clause protection against coerced confessions and to render a
waiver of Miranda's Fifth Amendment-based safeguards involuntary). Alternatively, the right
to counsel preserves the adversarial character of our system of adjudication by focusing upon
confrontations with the government or legal system in which lay defendants' deficiencies put
them at a disadvantage. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,685 (1984) ("The Sixth
Amendment recognizes the right to the assistance of counsel because it envisions counsel's
playing a role that is critical to the ability of the adversarial system to produce just results.").
291 Like the due process safeguard against unnecessarily suggestive identification proce-
dures, these protections further "an evidentiary interest." See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S.
98, 113-14 n. 14 (1977) (clarifying that due process does not protect the interest in not being
identified by means of a suggestive process, but, rather, protects the "evidentiary interest" in
not being unfairly convicted on the basis of evidence produced by an unnecessarily suggestive
identification process).
292 The reason that this part of the Sixth Amendment right has the appearance of an "exclu-
sionary rule" is that in Massiah contexts the prohibited government conduct occurs outside the
trial setting. If the government were to confront an unaided accused at trial in violation of his
entitlement to assistance, it is clear that the accused would be entitled to elimination of the harm
or injury caused by the fact-finder's exposure to disclosures stemming from this confrontation.
"Exclusion" of this evidence from the trial would be part of the accused's constitutional entitle-
ment. According to the Massiah doctrine's extension of the right to counsel, the entire period
following formal accusation should be thought of as part of the trial. See Massiah, 377 U.S. at
205. Any harm resulting from unequal clashes staged during this period must be eliminated
from the trial to ensure enjoyment of the benefits of the right to assistance.
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It is arguable that an additional, secondary objective of Massiah exclusion is the
deterrence of future uncounseled deliberate elicitations of admissions from accused
persons.293 There are at least three potential reasons why one might seek to discour-
age government agents from engaging in that conduct.294 First, one might conceive
of the assistance of counsel at pretrial confrontations as a process right. According
to this view, the right to counsel serves not only the interest in avoiding damage to the
chances for a favorable verdict, but also the independent interest in having an oppor-
tunity to face the government as an equal. A deprivation of this interest in fair process
would occur at the time of the elicitation, and Sixth Amendment exclusion, like Fourth
Amendment exclusion, would be aimed at preventing future deprivations.
It might also be desirable to discourage uncounseled deliberate elicitation in order
to eliminate otherwise undetected risks of unfair conviction that it can generate. Ex-
clusion of the identifiable products of an uncounseled elicitation-statements and their
fruits-may not fully restore the status quo ante. The government might use the in-
formation it acquires to disadvantage an unequalized defendant in subtler ways. Ac-
cording to this argument, suppression would aim to prevent conduct that results in
undetectable constitutional injuries.
Finally, deliberate elicitation without counsel might be seen as a threat to the
"295appearance of justice. Whether or not cognizable interests in a fair process are
at stake, official confrontations with an uncounseled accused might lead the public
to believe, or fear, that the government takes unfair advantage of accused persons and
fails to play by the rules. Suppression might seek to deter uncounseled elicitation in
order to preserve the appearance of justice and public confidence in the criminal
justice system.
In my view, the holding of Strickland lends support to the conclusion that exclusion is an
integral part of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Strickland's actual ineffectiveness doc-
trine requires a defendant to establish not only that his lawyer performed deficiently, but that
prejudice-a reasonable probability of a different outcome-resulted from that deficient
performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691-92. In the Court's view, a defendant is not deprived
of the right to counsel unless some injury to his chances for a favorable result occurs as a
result of the deprivation of the assistance to which he is entitled. Id. According to Strickland,
the right to counsel is made up of two components-a lawyer's competent aid and the advan-
tages at trial that flow that aid. See id. Incompetence alone is not sufficient to deny the Sixth
Amendment right. Id. Harm to one's chances for acquittal at trial is essential to deprivation of
the right to counsel because counsel exists for the purpose of improving the accused's chances
for a favorable outcome.
293 The Massiah Court did not seem to think that deterrence was an objective. See supra
note 235 and accompanying text (highlighting the Court's unhesitant approval of official elici-
tation of information from an accused in order to further an investigation).
294 I have previously discussed the plausibility of and arguments that might support a deter-
rent rationale for Massiah exclusion. See Tomkovicz, Massiah Right to Exclusion, supra note
225, at 770-72 & n.120.
295 See Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 160 (1988) (referring to the "interest" of fed-
eral courts "in ensuring ... that legal proceedings appear fair to all who observe them"); Offutt
v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954) ("[Jlustice must satisfy the appearance ofjustice.").
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In my earlier analysis, I found each of these possible bases for seeking to deter
deliberate elicitation to be unpersuasive.296 I am still inclined toward that position.
In my view, the only potentially meritorious reason to seek deterrence is the first--the
notion that fair process or fair treatment is also an interest furthered by the entitlement
to pretrial counsel. I am convinced that assistance at trial does further both substan-
tive and procedural goals-i.e., both interests in fair, reliable outcomes and interests in
fair play and process.2' I am still not persuaded, however, that these same "procedural"
interests are extant or sufficiently weighty in pretrial settings. Moreover, the more
nebulous concerns with potentially undetectable risks of substantive harm and with the
appearance of injustice are, in my view, outweighed by the government's investigatory
interests-i.e., society's legitimate interests in discovering what an accused knows
in order to effectively prosecute crime.
In any event, while it is a theoretically interesting question and one worthy of
attention, as a practical matter it is unnecessary to decide whether deterrence is a sup-
plemental aim of Sixth Amendment exclusion. It is highly unlikely that a secondary
deterrence rationale would increase the number of instances in which exclusion is
justified, expanding Sixth Amendment exclusion beyond the scope dictated by the
"rights" rationale. Put otherwise, if exclusion is not necessary to prevent a courtroom
deprivation of the entitlement to counsel, it seems highly improbable that deterrent
objectives-which must be balanced against competing governmental interests-would
dictate suppression.
D. Should the Elstad Doctrine Apply to Sixth Amendment Exclusionary
Determinations?
The question remanded in Fellers and subsequently resolved by the Eighth Circuit
is whether the doctrine of Oregon v. Elstad applies to Sixth Amendment deprivations.298
296 Tomkovicz, Massiah Right to Exclusion, supra note 225, at 767-68.
297 In this regard, I part company with the Strickland majority. According to the Court, a
mere deprivation of assistance is not a violation of the right to counsel. An accused must also
show "prejudice"-a sufficient likelihood that the missing assistance would have made a differ-
ence in terms of outcome. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691-92. In my view, because counsel is
a process right, one who does not receive the assistance to which he is entitled does suffer a
Sixth Amendment deprivation even if there is no negative impact on the outcome of the trial.
See id. at 711 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (suggesting that deficient performance alone deprives
an accused of the right to counsel promised by the Sixth Amendment because the "guarantee ...
functions to ensure that convictions are obtained only through fundamentally fair procedures"
and that a proceeding in which an accused lacks "meaningful assistance in meeting the forces
of the State does not.. . constitute due process").
298 Fellers v. United States, 540 U.S. 519, 525 (2004). In my earlier piece, after positing
that Sixth Amendment exclusion is primarily a constitutional right of the accused, I addressed
a number of specific Sixth Amendment exclusionary rule questions. See Tomkovicz, Massiah
Right to Exclusion, supra note 225, at 773-92. I did not, however, discuss the applicability
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More specifically, the issue is whether Elstad' s general rule of admissibility for succes-
sive confessions following compliance with Miranda governs situations where officers
first violate, then comply with, Massiah's Sixth Amendment constraints. A defensible
answer must account for the reasoning that supports Elstad and the justifications for
Sixth Amendment exclusion.
The Elstad doctrine is inextricably rooted in the particular purposes of the prophy-
lactic Miranda exclusionary rule--to provide adequate protection against the risks of
compulsory self-incrimination and, possibly, to deter law enforcement failures to follow
Miranda's custodial interrogation guidelines. As already explained, neither of those
objectives can justify exclusion of a successive confession because the risk that it is
compelled is too low and because any deterrent gains are outweighed by the costs."9
The Massiah exclusionary rule is dramatically different in character from the
Miranda rule. The differences should render Elstad's general rule of admissibility en-
tirely inapplicable to successive confessions following Massiah deprivations. Massiah
exclusion is not concerned with compulsion, is not designed to guard against the risks
of a constitutional violation, and is almost certainly not designed to deter out of court
conduct. A statement secured in violation of Massiah's Sixth Amendment standards
is barred from the courtroom by the Constitution itself. To allow the government to
use such a statement would be to permit a violation of the right to counsel to ripen in
court. To preserve an accused's constitutional entitlement, the government must be
deprived of statements obtained by uncounseled deliberate elicitation. The harvest of
unequalized adversarial confrontations before trial must not be allowed to disadvan-
tage the accused at trial.
At trial, the government must be denied every advantage it has acquired from im-
proper, unequal confrontations prior to trial. Any evidentiary edge derived from and
traceable to an encounter with an unassisted accused must be eliminated.300 If there
were no causal connection between an initial confession and a successive statement
obtained after respecting Massiah's commands, there would be no reason to exclude
the latter, for it would not be an advantage gained from the uncounseled interaction.
It is clear today, however, that the Elstad Court did not intend to deny the existence
of a psychological connection between improperly obtained and subsequent admissions.
Because of that causal link between the two statements, the Sixth Amendment requires
that the successive confession be kept from the courtroom.
Under the Sixth Amendment, the voluntariness of a successive confession cannot
determine its admissibility any more than it determines the admissibility of the initial
confession. The guarantee of counsel protects defendants against more than com-
pelled self-incrimination. It is different from and furnishes broader protection against
of the Elstad issue on that occasion.
299 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 219-24.
" Of course, to trigger the right to pretrial assistance, the "encounter" must involve "de-
liberate elicitation" as defined by Massiah doctrine. See Tomkovicz, PretrialAssistance, supra
note 7, at 516.
[Vol. 15:711
SAVING MASSIAH FROM ELSTAD
inculpatory admissions than the Fifth Amendment. Under the Sixth Amendment, the
strength or weakness of the link between the deprivation of assistance and an eviden-
tiary item should not matter. Cost-benefit balancing is inappropriate because the deter-
rence of out-of-court misconduct is not the primary objective of exclusion and because
an expansion of costly, constitutionally overbroad prophylaxis is not at stake.
What is at stake is the enforcement of perhaps the most fundamental constitu-
tional right accorded an accused by our Bill of Rights. 30 ' Any profit, even profit that
is remote and weakly linked to a denial of assistance threatens harm of a kind that the
guarantee of counsel is designed to prevent. Consequently, a successive confession
can be introduced without violating the Sixth Amendment only when it is shown to
be the result of an entirely independent decision to cooperate, a decision with no causal
relationship to the initial admission. The Constitution allows a successive confession
to be used to convict only if the government demonstrates that the awareness that the
cat was out of the bag had no influence in inducing the accused to make it.3° Barring
such a showing, exclusion is constitutionally required.30 3
For the same reasons, Patane' s rejection of a Miranda fruits doctrine should not
be extended to Sixth Amendment settings. Physical or other evidence that is derived
in fact from-that has any causal connection to--failures to honor the entitlement to
an equalizing assistant cannot be admitted into evidence without inflicting constitu-
tional damage. An accused has a fundamental trial right not to be convicted as a result
of advantages the government gains from confrontations without counsel. The fact
301 See JAMES J. TOMKovICz, THE RIGHT TO THE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 45-46 (2002).
302 The government's failure to respect the defendant's entitlement to counsel plus psycho-
logical realities justify requiring the government to carry the burden of proving no connection.
In addition, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for an accused to demonstrate that he was
influenced by an initial admission-unless there were comments by him or by the authorities
during the second confrontation that evinced his motivation for confessing again. Of course,
if officers in any way use an initial confession to induce a second confession, this will only
serve to strengthen the presumption that there is a causal link. In such cases, it will be all the
more difficult for the government to make the demonstration necessary to justify use of the
successive confession.
303 The Court could reach a contrary conclusion by refusing to assume any causal con-
nection and putting the burden on an accused to prove that a psychological disability caused
by the initial confession led him to confess again. This would be inconsistent with what Justice
O'Connor implicitly acknowledged in her Seibert dissent-that suspects are likely to be af-
fected by the awareness they have already admitted their guilt and that a factual connection be-
tween first and second admissions should generally be assumed to exist. Missouri v. Seibert,
542 U.S. 600,628 (2004) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). It would also be inconsistent with pre-
Elstad recognitions by the Court that there is, in fact, a likely connection between initial and
subsequent admissions of guilt. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 605 n. 12 (1975) (recog-
nizing that initial admissions do operate psychologically to produce subsequent confessions);
United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532,540 (1947) ("Of course, after an accused has once let the
cat out of the bag by confessing, no matter what the inducement, he is never thereafter free of
the psychological and practical disadvantages of having confessed. He can never get the cat
back in the bag. The secret is out for good.").
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that the confrontation of an unequalized adversary has occurred prior to trial cannot
be allowed to undermine that trial right. To avoid circumvention of the right to assis-
tance and ensure that the Sixth Amendment's promise is fulfilled, all incriminating evi-
dence derived from statements secured in violation of Massiah must be excluded. 4
Similarly, the prosecution must not be allowed to impeach the accused or any
defense witnesses with any evidence-initial confessions, successive confessions, or
other derivative evidence-that has been gained through a deprivation of pretrial assis-
tance. 5 To protect the interest in not being convicted as a result of unequal adver-
sarial encounters, the state must be stripped of every advantage it has reaped. The
introduction of evidence for limited impeachment purposes may not be as incriminat-
ing or injurious as the introduction of the same inculpatory evidence to prove guilt
directly. 3°6 Still, it affords the prosecution a trial edge to which it is not entitled, one
that it never would have acquired had it honored the right to the assistance. 7
3' For a fuller, pre-Patane discussion of this issue, see Tomkovicz, Massiah Right to
Exclusion, supra note 225, at 781-82. As noted there, the Sixth Amendment derivative evi-
dence principle must be more expansive than the Fourth Amendment derivative evidence prin-
ciple. Because the latter is considered a mere deterrent safeguard, cost-benefit balancing is
thought appropriate and justifies the introduction of evidence with an "attenuated" causal con-
nection. Because the Sixth Amendment rule is an integral part of the right, balancing is inappro-
priate and an "attenuation exception" is illegitimate. The Framers did the balancing in granting
a right to assistance which protects against all injuries resulting from imbalanced confrontations.
305 The contention here is that there is a ban on impeachment use for the fruits of "core"
Massiah violations. If the Court is correct that the rule of Michigan v. Jackson is an overbroad
prophylactic protection for the right to counsel akin to Miranda's safeguards-a questionable,
but defensible conclusion-then the conclusion that impeachment use is permissible for evi-
dence acquired in violation of the Jackson rule is defensible. See supra text accompanying
notes 260-70. For evidence acquired from core Massiah violations, however, impeachment
use would violate the Sixth Amendment.
" Of course, impeachment use may also be quite devastating, severely undermining testi-
mony that otherwise would raise a reasonable doubt in jurors' minds. And it is hard to deny that
jurors may have difficulty confining such evidence to its proper purpose. De facto substantive
impacts seem likely even when jurors conscientiously try to avoid them. See Bruton v. United
States, 391 U.S. 123, 132 (1968) ("'Limiting instructions to thejury may not in fact erase...
prejudice."' (quoting the Advisory Committee on the 1966 amendments to Rule 14 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure)); id. at 135 ("[T]here are some contexts in which the risk
that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of fail-
ure so vital... that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored.");
Dennis J. Devine et al., Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of Empirical Research on Deliber-
ating Groups, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 622, 666 (2001) ("In general, limiting instruc-
tions have proven to be ineffective and have even been associated with a paradoxical increase
in the targeted behavior."); J. Alexander Tanford, The Law and Psychology ofJury Instructions,
69 NEB. L. REv. 71, 86 (1990) ("Admonishing jurors often provokes the opposite of the in-
tended effect.").
307 For a fuller discussion, see Tomkovicz, Massiah Right to Exclusion, supra note 225,
at 787-89.
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On remand in Fellers, the Eighth Circuit engaged in a remarkably thoughtful and
thorough analysis of the remanded exclusionary rule issue,' but it arrived at the wrong
conclusion. The court decided that Elstad has the same force in Sixth Amendment con-
texts that it has in Miranda settings, and, as a result, that Fellers's jailhouse statements
were admissible despite the initial Massiah violation. 309 The aim here is to highlight
some of the aspects of the court's reasoning that are analytically sound and to identify
the missteps that led to a faulty outcome.31°
The appellate court took several sound analytical steps. It recognized the need to
attend to the purposes of the right to counsel, acknowledged that Sixth Amendment ex-
clusion seeks to ensure trial fairness, and asserted that suppression is necessary if the
government's improper pretrial conduct is causally linked to evidence at issue.3 ' The
court also perceptively observed that Elstad allows the admission of successive, post-
warning confessions after initial Miranda violations because neither the aim of prevent-
ing compulsion nor the goal of deterrence support suppression. 2 The analysis went
awry, however, when the Eighth Circuit sought to meld its understanding of Elstad' s
Fifth Amendment doctrine with its conception of Sixth Amendment suppression.
According to the court, the introduction of the successive confession in Fellers-
hisjailhouse statements-was legitimate because a "knowing, intelligent, and voluntary
[waiver of the] right to counsel constitutes an intervening act of free will that breaks
the causal link between" the initial and the subsequent statements.313 The court rejected
the defendant's reliance on the psychological impact of knowing he had "'let the cat
out of the bag,"' asserting that Elstad "squarely rejected" that premise under Miranda
and that Elstad' s analysis was "equally applicable" to Massiah settings. 314 As in Elstad,
the infirmity that made the initial statement inadmissible was eliminated--or "cured"-
by the subsequent adherence to the Sixth Amendment's dictates.31 5
This reasoning is flawed because intervening warnings and a valid waiver do not
negate the causal connection between an initial and a second admission. The Elstad
Court did not deny the reality of the psychological disability that results from con-
fessing once. It did not reject the premise that there may, in fact, be a psychological
308 United States v. Fellers, 397 F.3d 1090, 1094-97 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S.
Ct. 415 (2005).
309 Id. at 1093.
310 No attempt is made here to fully capture the court's reasoning. A complete description
of the Eighth Circuit's reasoning appears earlier. See supra Part I.B.
311 See supra text accompanying notes 42-61. The court's depiction of the underpinnings
of Sixth Amendment exclusion was not flawless. It observed that the Supreme Court had
established deterrence as the "core reason" for Sixth Amendment exclusion. This apparent
acceptance of what I find to be an extremely misguided characterization of Massiah-based
suppression does not seem to have contributed to the Court's ultimately erroneous conclusion
about Elstad's applicability.
312 Fellers, 397 F.3d at 1095.
311 Id. at 1096 (emphasis added).
114 Id. at 1097 n.2.
311 Id. at 1095.
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link between an initial statement and a post-warning statement. Rather, the Elstad
Court held that warnings and waiver eliminate the basis for presuming compulsion and
that any resulting psychological disability does not qualify as official.compulsion.316
For those reasons, the primary rationale for Miranda exclusion does not call for ex-
clusion of a second, post-warning confession. Warnings and waiver "cure" the prob-
lem for Miranda purposes because they dispel compulsion, minimizing the risk of a
Fifth Amendment violation at trial.
As stated earlier, the absence of compulsion alone does not remedy the Sixth
Amendment problem. The Sixth Amendment grants a broad right not to be convicted
on the basis of evidentiary advantages gained from unequalized confrontations. Un-
like Miranda, Massiah's logic demands that there be no connection between the out
of court deprivation and evidence the state wishes to introduce.317 It is true that Sixth
Amendment exclusion should not put the government in a worse evidentiary position
than it would have occupied without improper conduct. An accused has no constitu-
tional entitlement to have his adversary disadvantaged because of the failure to respect
the entitlement to assistance. It is equally true, however, that the Sixth Amendment
forbids the government from occupying a better evidentiary position as the result
of an imbalanced adversarial confrontation. Because of the relationship between an
initial Massiah violation and a successive confession, the Sixth Amendment com-
mands exclusion.31 8
316 Id.
317 Alternatively, the evidence is admissible if there is a connection, but the evidence would
inevitably have been discovered lawfully. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431,444,448 (1984).
In that situation, the government is not actually benefitting from the counsel deprivation, and
the accused is not disadvantaged at trial in any way that his entitlement to counsel would
have prevented.
318 In rejecting Fellers's claim for exclusion of hisjailhouse statements, the Eighth Circuit
also relied on the following facts: that officers did not use the first statement to prompt the
second admission, that they would have had a basis for the questioning that led to the second
statement without having obtained the first statement, and that the content of the second
statement went well beyond the content of the first. Fellers, 397 F.3d at 1095-96. While
these facts would seem relevant to a determination of whether there is any causal connection
between first and second statements, they do not necessarily break the presumptive causal
chain.
The Eighth Circuit attempted to bolster its reasoning by citing Patterson v. Illinois, 487
U.S. 285 (1988), which it characterized as a recognition that the usefulness of a lawyer is not
significantly different in pre- and post-accusation settings. See supra text accompanying notes
62--64. This reliance on Patterson was misguided. The Patterson Court by no means suggested
that the nature and objectives of Miranda's protections and of the Massiah right to counsel are
the same. In fact, the Court has made it very clear that Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections
are different because "the policies underlying the two [provisions] are quite distinct." Rhode
Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300 n.4 (1980) (emphasis added). The Patterson Court itself
concluded that, even though a waiver of Miranda counsel is valid when a suspect is not in-
formed that his attorney wishes to speak to him, a waiver of Massiah counsel in those circum-
stances would be invalid. Patterson, 487 U.S. at 296 n.9. This doctrinal distinction undoubtedly
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CONCLUSION
United States v. Fellers raised an interesting and significant Sixth Amendment
exclusionary rule issue that afforded the Supreme Court a chance to address long
neglected subjects-the nature of and the objectives served by excluding evidence
obtained in violation of the Massiah entitlement to pretrial assistance. Unfortu-
nately, the Justices chose not to exploit the opportunity. They strained to construe
the lower court's opinion in Fellers in a way that led to a remand of the exclusionary
rule issue. Then, when the defendant sought review a second time, the Court refused
to consider his claim.3" 9 As a consequence, the Court's views about Sixth Amendment
exclusion and the applicability of Oregon v. Elstad to right to counsel deprivations
remain uncertain.
In this Article, I have sought to illuminate the Miranda exclusionary rule and the
reasoning that underlies the Elstad doctrine and to explain how Elstad's limitation on
exclusion can be reconciled with Miranda's prophylactic Fifth Amendment scheme.
I then offered what I consider to be the only sensible constitutional explanation for
the Sixth Amendment exclusionary rule-that it is an inseparable part of the right to
counsel and mandates a bar at trial to all evidence acquired before trial in violation of
Massiah's standards. Because a successive confession acquired after compliance
with Massiah's restrictions is presumptively connected to an initial confession that
is the product of a right to counsel deprivation, Elstad's general rule of admissibility
should not be extended to the Sixth Amendment realm. Instead, an accused must have
an entitlement to have successive confessions, along with all other derivative evidence,
suppressed from his trial. Evidence acquired after the right to counsel has been denied
rests on the differences in the characters and aims of the two guarantees. Moreover, the Court's
unanimous holding in Fellers v. United States, 540 U.S. 519 (2004), that interrogation is not
necessary to trigger the Massiah entitlement to assistance is clearly based on a recognition that
the characters and purposes of Fifth and Sixth Amendment counsel are quite different. See
Tomkovicz, Pretrial Assistance, supra note 7, at 518-24.
The Eighth Circuit also reasoned that the admission of Fellers's second confession was
consistent with the standards announced in Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004). See supra
text accompanying notes 68-71. While that conclusion may be entirely correct, it has no rele-
vance to the question of whether Elstad applies to Massiah violations. Seibert addresses the
circumstances in which warnings given before successive confessions cannot effectively serve
Miranda's purposes. See supra text accompanying notes 157-76. Because successive con-
fessions are not subject to exclusion as fruits of Miranda violations, the efficacy of the warn-
ings is determinative of their admissibility. The fact that warnings are effective, however, does
not mean that a successive confession is causally unconnected to an initial confession. Con-
sequently, Seibert analysis cannot control the admissibility of a successive confession after
a right to counsel deprivation. Of course, in a Sixth Amendment case, if the circumstances were
such that warnings could not be effective there would be an additional reason for excluding
a successive confession.
319 Fellers v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 415 (2005).
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may be admitted only if the government shows that it was in no part the product of
that denial.
The hope is that this Article has done more than provide a logical answer to the
narrow exclusionary rule question sidestepped by the Supreme Court and resolved in-
correctly by the Court of Appeals. The aim here has been not only to "save Massiah
from Elstad," but also to expose the true character of Sixth Amendment exclusion and
thereby provide a solid foundation for the resolution of all Sixth Amendment exclu-
sionary rule issues.
The Miranda and Massiah doctrines have dramatically different characters and pur-
poses. With Miranda's Fifth Amendment safeguards against official efforts to secure
and use confessions in decline, it is vital to preserve the shelter provided by the right
to counsel. That shelter can be threatened by inappropriately restrictive interpretations
of the circumstances in which an accused is entitled to assistance. It can also be eroded
by the facile, ill-considered transposition of irrelevant exclusionary rule reasoning and
limitations-in particular, those underlying and applicable to Miranda suppression.
In an earlier piece concerning the Supreme Court's substantive Sixth Amendment
holding in Fellers, I applauded the Court's unanimous decision that interrogation is
not necessary to trigger the entitlement to assistance. 320 That holding reflected an im-
plicit appreciation for the differences between the preventive constitutional safeguards
provided by Miranda and the core constitutional right preserved by Massiah. When
Sixth Amendment exclusion issues-including the question of Elstad' s applicability-
do arrive on the Court's doorstep, one can only hope that the Justices will show the
same appreciation for the fundamental constitutional right to the assistance of counsel.
320 See Tomkovicz, Pretrial Assistance, supra note 7, at 530-31.
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